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UTILITARIANISM WITH AND WITHOUT EXPECTED UTILITY
DAVID MCCARTHY, KALLE MIKKOLA, AND TERUJI THOMAS
Abstract. We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk,
one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable popula-
tions. Intra and interpersonal comparisons are encoded in a single ‘individ-
ual preorder’. The individual preorder then uniquely determines the social
preorder. The theorems have features that may be considered characteristic
of Harsanyi-style utilitarianism, such as indifference to ex ante and ex post
equality. If in addition the individual preorder satisfies expected utility, the
social preorder must be represented by expected total utility. In the constant
population case, this is the conclusion of the social aggregation theorem of
Harsanyi [63] under anonymity, but contra Harsanyi, it is derived without as-
suming expected utility at the social level. However, the theorems are also
consistent with the rejection of all of the expected utility axioms, at both the
individual and social levels. Thus expected utility is inessential to Harsanyi’s
approach under anonymity. In fact, the variable population theorem imposes
only a mild constraint on the individual preorder, while the constant popula-
tion theorem imposes no constraint at all. We therefore give further results
related to additional constraints on the individual preorder. First, stronger
utilitarian-friendly assumptions, like Pareto or strong separability, are essen-
tially equivalent to the main expected utility axiom of strong independence.
Second, the individual preorder satisfies strong independence if and only if the
social preorder has a mixture-preserving total utility representation; here the
utility values can be taken as vectors in a preordered vector space, or more
concretely as lexicographically ordered matrices of real numbers. Third, if
the individual preorder satisfies a ‘local expected utility’ condition popular in
nonexpected utility theory, then the social preorder is ‘locally utilitarian’.
JEL Classification. D60, D63, D81.
Keywords. Harsanyi, utilitarianism, expected utility, nonexpected utility,
egalitarianism, variable populations.
Introduction
The central results of this article are two social aggregation theorems under
conditions of risk, one for the constant population case, the other an extension
to variable populations. These were prompted by a puzzle about Harsanyi’s [63]
celebrated social aggregation theorem. Following Harsanyi [64, 65] and many others,
we take interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons to be encoded in a single
preorder, which we will call the individual preorder. What we will call Harsanyi’s
anonymous theorem shows that in the constant population case, if the individual
and social preorders satisfy the expected utility axioms,1 strong Pareto is satisfied,
and anonymity is imposed, then the social preorder is uniquely determined by
David McCarthy thanks the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region, China (HKU 750012H) for support. Teruji Thomas similarly thanks the Arts and
Humanities Research Council (UK).
1For notational convenience, we take the expected utility axioms to apply to preorders, so that
preordering is not itself taken to be an expected utility axiom.
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the individual preorder.2 In particular, it is represented by the expected sum of
individual utilities.
It is easy to get the impression from Harsanyi that his theorem is somehow
all about expected utility. But the axioms of expected utility theory are quite
limiting, and their significance for his theory is not entirely clear. They are most
controversial for the social preorder, but even for the individual preorder, and even
at the normative level, each of the axioms has been denied. The completeness
axiom implies that all individual goods are comparable, but this has frequently
been challenged. Loosely speaking, continuity axioms deny that some individual
goods are infinitely more valuable than others, but this is sometimes said to be
a merely technical assumption, and can be explicitly rejected in cases involving
extreme outcomes such as torture or death. The independence axiom also has its
critics at the normative level; some, for example, maintain that the paradoxical
preference structure in the Allais paradox is rational.3
The puzzle therefore arises as to what extent the limitations of expected utility
theory can be avoided while following an approach to social aggregation that is
somehow still in the spirit of Harsanyi. In particular, to what extent can one leave
out the premise of expected utility theory while retaining the conclusion that the
individual preorder uniquely determines the social preorder?
Each of the expected utility axioms has also been challenged at the positive
level. There are well-documented violations of completeness and independence,
and continuity has often been regarded as difficult to test for, raising a doubt about
including it with other axioms in positive theories.4 This prompts the question of
to what extent subjects’ social judgments reflect their expected-utility-violating
judgments about individual risk. But to approach this question, we first need a
conceptual connection between the two levels of judgment, providing another reason
to ask whether Harsanyi’s approach can be preserved while relaxing expected utility.
Finally, even if one is confident in expected utility, it is still of considerable
theoretical interest to ask to what extent Harsanyi’s approach has to rely upon it,
particularly given the central role contrasts with utilitarianism have played in the
development of other distributive theories.5
Section 1 presents our constant population aggregation theorem, Theorem 1.3.1.
It shows that three plausible and relatively weak premises, which we call Anteriority,
Two-Stage Anonymity, and Reduction to Prospects, are sufficient for the individual
preorder to uniquely determine the social preorder, with no restrictions at all on
the individual preorder. In particular, the expected utility axioms can all fail at
both the individual and the social levels.
Section 2 extends this result to the variable population case in Theorem 2.3.1.
Here, the individual preorder is extended to deal with comparisons between lotteries
involving nonexistence as possible states for an individual. Our constant population
axioms extend to the variable case more or less trivially. When combined with a
mild restriction on welfare comparisons involving nonexistence which we call Omega
2Harsanyi often stated this result informally, but for an explicit statement, see e.g.
Harsanyi [65, §4.1]. For a relatively simple proof, use Proposition 1 of De Meyer and Mon-
gin [41] to obtain the conclusion of Harsanyi’s original theorem, then impose anonymity to obtain
the result.
3For entries into a vast literature, see e.g. Pivato [89] and Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok [47] (com-
pleteness as deniable); Richter [92] and Fishburn [51] (continuity as a technical assumption); Luce
and Raiffa [73] and Kreps [72] (continuity as deniable); Allais [2] and Buchak [28] (independence
as deniable).
4See, for example, Starmer [103], Schmidt [97] and Wakker [106].
5We understand ‘utilitarianism’ in the spirit of a utilitarian interpretation of Harsanyi’s anony-
mous theorem. But we offer no argument for this. Those who dispute this interpretation, like
Sen [99, 100] and Weymark [108], can replace ‘utilitarianism’ with ‘Harsanyi-style utilitarianism’.
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Independence, the individual preorder still uniquely determines the social preorder,
and the expected utility axioms can still all fail at both levels.
Given that the individual preorder is completely unconstrained in the constant
population case, and almost unconstrained in the variable case, much of the paper
focuses on consequences for the social preorder of imposing normatively or posi-
tively natural conditions on the individual preorder. Section 1.5 illustrates how
standard utilitarianism, leximin, incomplete and rank-dependent social preorders
emerge from natural choices for the individual preorder. In the variable population
case, Section 2.5 and 2.6 show how critical level utilitarianism, different forms of
average utilitarianism, and various ways of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion of
Parfit [88] emerge from natural choices for the individual preorder, including differ-
ent philosophical treatments of the value of existence. These examples foreshadow
general results under the assumptions of our aggregation theorems.
Section 3 focuses on imposing expected utility conditions on the individual pre-
order, and gives four types of results. First, Proposition 3.1.1 shows that if the
individual preorder satisfies any of a wide range of axioms associated with expected
utility theory, then so does the social preorder.
Second, Proposition 3.2.1 shows that various Pareto, separability, and indepen-
dence axioms are essentially equivalent. For example, although it seems to have
gone unmentioned in the literature, what appears to be the strongest plausible
Pareto condition turns out to be essentially equivalent to the strongest and best
known independence condition, strong independence, as well as to a strong sepa-
rability condition. Once one has imposed strong independence on the individual
preorder, it is therefore redundant to impose any of strong independence or the
corresponding Pareto and separability conditions on the social preorder.
Third, Proposition 3.3.1 shows that if the individual preorder has an expected
utility integral representation, then the social preorder has a total expected utility or
expected total utility representation. In its simplest form, this provides a derivation
of the conclusion of Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem from premises which are vastly
weaker than Harsanyi’s. But the general form of expected utility representation we
consider takes values in (typically infinite-dimensional) preordered vector spaces.
As we explain, preordered vector spaces are particularly suitable for understanding
generalized total utility representations. The advantage here is that we can provide
total expected utility representations while allowing for failures of both continuity
and completeness.
Fourth, Proposition 3.4.2, the main result of section 3, is that the individual pre-
order is strongly independent if and only if the social preorder has a Harsanyi-like to-
tal utility mixture-preserving representation into a preordered vector space. Propo-
sition 3.4.4 then shows that this representation can be expressed as a Harsanyi-like
total utility lexicographic representation involving a matrix of mixture-preserving
real-valued functions. The rows and columns of this matrix are generally infinite.
But when in addition the individual preorder is complete, the matrix can be taken
to be a single row matrix. When the individual preorder is mixture continuous,
it can be taken to be a single column matrix. When the individual preorder is
complete and mixture continuous, it can be given a single entry.
Section 4 explores analogous issues for nonexpected utility theory, again under
the assumptions of our aggregation theorems. We first note that if the individ-
ual preorder satisfies any of a wide range of nonexpected utility axioms, then so
does the social preorder. But this is not universal. For example, monotonicity,
or respect for stochastic dominance, has been seen as a very weak and plausible
condition, and some popular nonexpected utility theories have been built around
it. Nevertheless, Example 4.1.2 shows that imposing many of these theories on
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the individual preorder leads to the forced rejection of monotonicity for the social
preorder. In fact, monotonicity is a demanding condition at the social level. Propo-
sitions 4.2.2 and 4.2.4 then show that when the individual preorder satisfies a ‘local
expected utility’ condition in the style of Machina [74], (specifically: representabil-
ity by a Gaˆteaux differentiable function), then the social preorder is a form of ‘local
utilitarianism’. This forms part of our case that while social preorders generated
by strongly independent individual preorders should be seen as utilitarian, social
preorders generated by any individual preorder under the conditions of our aggre-
gation theorems are appropriately described as ‘generalized utilitarian’, although
we use this term differently from some of the literature. We call those which violate
strong independence ‘nonexpected utilitarian’.
Section 5 relates our aggregation theorems to some standard topics. Nonex-
pected utilitarian social preorders form an important but apparently undiscussed
class, and section 5.1 contrasts them with egalitarian social preorders. At the level
of outcomes, nonexpected utilitarian preorders can coincide with all kinds of egal-
itarian preorders. Nevertheless, there is a sharp contrast at the level of risk. All
generalized utilitarian preorders are in a precise sense indifferent to both ex ante
and ex post equality. But the fact that nonexpected utilitarian preorders can ap-
pear egalitarian at the level of outcomes suggests that many apparently egalitarian
social judgments may actually be expressions of independence-violating attitudes to
individual risk. This suggests directions for empirical work. Section 5.2 reconsiders
the ex ante versus ex post distinction (at least in the framework of risk) and sug-
gest a simplification which is detached from expected utility theory. Generalized
utilitarian social preorders are then those which, in a natural and precise sense,
are weakly ex ante and anonymously ex post. Section 5.3 discusses the disputed
role of interpersonal comparisons in Harsanyi’s approach to social aggregation. By
comparing our results with those of Pivato [89], we argue that our approach solves
a crucial difficulty in Harsanyi’s. Section 5.4 ends by concluding that while the
present work amplifies several of Harsanyi’s insights, the core of his anonymous
theorem turns out to have nothing to do with expected utility theory. Most proofs
are in the appendix.
From a technical point of view, we make several contributions to utility theory,
expected utility theory in particular. First, the general form of expected utility
representations we consider in section 3.3 uses the weak integral rather than the
ordinary (Lebesgue) integral. As far as we know, the weak integral has been little
used in expected utility theory. But this approach allows us to state expected-
utility-style integral representations with a single utility function into a preordered
vector space without having to assume either continuity or completeness. It al-
lows us to subsume as a special case the common representation of incomplete but
strongly independent and continuous preorders on probability measures via fam-
ilies of real-valued expected utility functions. Second, Theorem 2.4.2 shows that
any preorder on a convex set, and a fortiori a convex set of probability measures,
can be represented by a single function into a preordered vector space. Third, The-
orem 3.4.1 shows that any strongly independent preorder on a convex set can be
represented by a single mixture-preserving function into a preordered vector space.
Fourth, Theorem 3.4.3 shows that in the latter case, the preorder can also be given
a lexicographic mixture-preserving representation involving a matrix of real-valued
functions. This last result rests on a fundamental structure theorem for preordered
vector spaces. To situate this, the best known result for complete, strongly indepen-
dent preorders of probability measures in expected utility theory is Hausner [68].
This rests on a structure theorem for ordered vector spaces given in Hausner and
Wendel [69]. By contrast, our Theorem 3.4.5 applies to more general preordered
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vector spaces, allowing for incompleteness, and unlike theirs, our representation is
essentially unique and constructively defined.
Related literature. We remark on other work weakening the expected utility as-
sumptions in Harsanyi’s approach. In the present informational framework in which
interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons are encoded within a single preorder,
and which models risk, not uncertainty, the closest work to this article in the con-
stant population case is Pivato [89]. Pivato shows that if the individual and social
preorders satisfy Pareto and independence axioms, then the social preorder must
be one of a potentially large class of social preorders naturally generated by the
individual preorder. Our results improve on this picture in four ways. First, our
basic result shows that the social preorder is uniquely determined by the individual
preorder. Second, this result places no restrictions on the individual preorder, in
particular permitting it to violate any independence axiom. Third, it extends eas-
ily to the variable population case. Fourth, granted one apparently novel but very
simple and plausible idea, our axioms are much weaker than Pivato’s.
Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem is extended to the variable population case by
Hammond [58] and Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [15, 16, 18], using the full
expected utility framework plus further ethical assumptions. Pivato [90, Thm. 1]
provides a very general result, one of whose interpretations applies to the variable
population case we consider here. We consider these comparisons in more detail in
section 5.4. But to anticipate, our treatment of the variable population case rests
on much weaker ethical assumptions than Pivato’s. Unlike ours, however, Pivato’s
framework is explicitly designed to allow for infinitesimal probabilities and to be ex-
tended to cover infinite populations. Thus Pivato [90] and the present work extend
Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem in somewhat complementary directions. Curiously,
Harsanyi himself does not seem to have thought that his anonymous theorem ex-
tends to the variable case, preferring instead a veil of ignorance approach. But
in section 5.4 we show that Harsanyi’s briefly expressed ideas on the topic can be
accommodated within our approach.
Harsanyi’s [63] original aggregation theorem explicitly models only intrapersonal
comparisons, and whether it implicitly assumes interpersonal comparisons has been
disputed. Its conclusion is that the social preorder can be represented by the ex-
pected sum of weighted individual utilities. If strong Pareto is imposed, the weights
must be strictly positive, but are otherwise undetermined. Mongin and Pivato [84]
have shown how to recover this theorem from a more general result which relies only
on separability assumptions. In the informational framework of Harsanyi’s original
theorem, Danan, Gajdos and Tallon [40] have dropped completeness at the individ-
ual and social levels from Harsanyi’s premises, and shown that the social preorder
must be represented by a generalized form of Harsanyi’s conclusion. As they note,
however, the underdetermination of weights, and consequent nonuniqueness of the
social preorder, is more severe in this context. Those who regard this nonuniqueness
as a drawback may perhaps be moved to overcome any scruples about interpersonal
comparisons and move to the present informational framework, especially as it al-
lows for any degree of incomparability between different kinds of lives.
Diamond [42] criticized the premises of Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem for being
indifferent to ex ante equality. This has led to two ways of weakening Harsanyi’s
assumption that the individual and social preorders satisfy independence. Epstein
and Segal [48], and Ben-Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler [10], for example, weaken
independence for the social preorder far enough to accommodate a strict social
preference for ex ante equality. These models maintain expected utility at the
individual level. By contrast, Saito [95], for example, equips individuals with a
direct concern for ex ante equality, leading to a violation of independence at the
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individual level (but keeping completeness and continuity). By contrast, our model
sticks closer to Harsanyi in maintaining indifference to ex ante equality. We drop the
expected utility axioms at the individual level not to directly encode social concerns,
but to allow for a richer view about individual welfare comparisons, including a
wider range of views about risk and welfare.
An obstacle to generalizing Harsanyi’s original theorem to the subjective ex-
pected utility framework is that an impossibility result comes from combining
Pareto and nondictatorship (Hylland and Zeckhauser [70]; Mongin [81]; Mongin
and Pivato [84]). But Pareto can be criticized in this context because of the possi-
bility of what Mongin [82] calls spurious anonymity, and a number of writers have
sought to weaken it. This has been done while maintaining the SEU framework
and both the individual and the social levels (Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler [55];
Billot and Vergopoulos [11]). But it has also been done by weakening the SEU
framework; see further Alon and Gayer [3]; Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong [27];
Danan et al [39]; and Qu [91]. Our aggregation theorems also do not assume Pareto,
but whether this might prove useful in extending our framework to the subjective
context remains to be seen.
1. A Constant Population Aggregation Theorem
1.1. Framework. We are ultimately concerned with the social ranking of lotter-
ies over outcomes in which individuals have particular lives. But given the view
that social welfare depends only on information about individual welfare (see e.g.
Sen [101, 102]), we need only individuate outcomes in terms of each individual’s
welfare level. Given a set of lives and an indifference relation ‘exactly as good a
life as’, we could think of the set of welfare levels as the partition of the set of
lives under the indifference relation. We take no view about what constitutes wel-
fare, so our discussion will compatible with all the usual views, including preference
satisfaction, hedonistic, and more objective accounts.
Formally, however, our basic framework starts with a set W of welfare levels,
and a finite, nonempty set I of individuals. We also assume given a set H of
histories. A ‘history’ (or welfare distribution) here is an assignment of welfare
levels to individuals; we write Wi(h) for the welfare level that individual i has in
history h. We could take H to contain all logically possible histories, and then H
would equal WI, the product of copies of W indexed by I. But we can allow H to
be any subset of WI that satisfies certain conditions shortly to be announced.
Besides welfare levels and histories per se, we consider probability measures over
them. Thus we assume that W and H are measurable spaces. We call probability
measures over W prospects, and those over H lotteries. Notationally, if P is (say) a
prospect and U is a measurable subset of W, then we write P (U) for the probability
that P assigns to U . Instead of just considering all prospects and all lotteries, we
will, for generality, focus on arbitrary non-empty convex sets P and L of prospects
and lotteries respectively.
Here is what we will assume about the finite set I, the measurable spaces W and
H ⊂WI, and the convex sets of probability measures P and L.
(A). First, we assume that for each individual i ∈ I the projection Wi : H→W is
a measurable function. This allows us to define a prospect Pi(L) for each lottery
L. Explicitly, if U is a measurable subset of W, then
Pi(L)(U) = L(W−1i (U)).
We further assume that Pi(L) ⊂ P.
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(B). Second, for each w ∈W, we assume that that H contains the history H(w) in
which every individual i ∈ I has welfare w. Thus
Wi(H(w)) = w.
We further assume that the function H : W→ H is measurable. This allows us
to define a lottery L(P ) for each prospect P . Explicitly, if V is a measurable subset
of H, then
L(P )(V ) = P (H−1(V )).
In L(P ), every individual i ∈ I faces prospect P (Pi(L(P )) = P ), and it is certain
that all individuals have the same welfare.6
We further assume that L(P) ⊂ L.
(C). Third, we assume that H is invariant under permutations of individuals. For-
mally, let Σ be the group of permutations of I. For each σ ∈ Σ and h ∈ H, the
assumption is that H contains the history σh such that
Wi(σh) =Wσ−1i(h)
for all i ∈ I.
We further assume that the action of Σ on H is measurable. That is: if V ⊂ H
is measurable, then σV is measurable, for any σ ∈ Σ. This allows us to define an
action of Σ on lotteries L:
(σL)(V ) := L(σ−1V )
for any σ ∈ Σ, lottery L and measurable V ⊂ H.
We further assume that L is invariant under this action.
Remark 1.1.1. The various measurability conditions are automatically met if H
has the product sigma algebra, i.e. the smallest one for which the functions Wi
are measurable. For example, to check that H is measurable with respect to that
sigma algebra, it suffices to check that H−1(W−1i (U)) is measurable whenever U is
a measurable subset of W. But, in fact, H−1(W−1i (U)) = U . It is worth remarking
that the product sigma algebra may not be the most natural one. For example, if
W = R with the Lebesgue sigma algebra, then the Lebesgue sigma algebra on H is
not the product one – but it would also suffice for our purposes.
Remark 1.1.2. The assumption that L(P) ⊂ L may seem unrealistic: if some are
to have the welfare levels of kings, others may have to have the welfare levels of
paupers. Thus general applications of our results will have to assume the ethical
relevance of logically possible but non-feasible domains. But we do not regard this
as a particular difficulty for our approach, partly as all results in this area we know
of need such a principle to handle some feasible sets. For example, they typically
assume that the feasible set of lotteries is convex, but convexity can fail; there may
be a cost to randomization.
1.2. Axioms for Aggregation. Now we assume that P and L are each preordered.
The preorder %P on P is the individual preorder; the preorder % on L is the social
preorder. As already mentioned, the individual preorder encodes interpersonal
and intrapersonal comparisons. Thus for any individuals i and j, not necessarily
distinct, Pi(L) %P Pj(L′) if and only if L is at least as good for i as L′ is for j. We
will use obvious notation, e.g. writing P ∼P P ′ to mean the conjunction of P %P P ′
and P ′ %P P . Since %P is allowed to be incomplete, we will also write P upriseP P ′ to
mean neither P %P P ′ nor P ′ %P P .
6This second statement just means that any measurable subset of H containing the image of H
has probability 1 according to L(P ). We do not assume that the image of H is itself measurable.
It may not be, even when H has the product sigma algebra, without modest further assumptions
(see Dravecky´ [45]).
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We will sometimes informally treat the individual and social preorders as ranking
welfare levels and histories respectively. Strictly speaking, this presupposes that we
can identify welfare levels and histories with the corresponding degenerate prospects
and lotteries. This does not always make sense in our framework: singletons may
not be measurable, and degenerate probability measures may not be in the convex
sets of probability measures under consideration. But we often ignore this detail.
Our first principle of aggregation says that the social preorder only depends on
which prospect each individual faces.
Anteriority. If Pi(L) = Pi(L′) for every i ∈ I, then L ∼ L′.
Second, we need a principle which captures the idea that individual welfare
contributes positively towards social welfare.
Reduction to Prospects. For any P, P ′ ∈ P, L(P ) % L(P ′) if and only if
P %P P ′.
These two principles are relatively weak. We discuss their relation to stronger and
more familiar Pareto principles in section 5.2.1,7 where we argue that they express
a weak sense in which the social preorder is ex ante.
Third, we need a principle of impartiality or permutation-invariance. The sim-
plest such principle is
Anonymity. Given L ∈ L and σ ∈ Σ, we have L ∼ σL.
We will in fact use the following slightly stronger condition.
Two-Stage Anonymity. Given L,M ∈ L, σ ∈ Σ, and α ∈ [0, 1],
αL+ (1− α)M ∼ α(σL) + (1− α)M.
Two-Stage Anonymity can be motivated in at least two ways. First, define an
‘anonymous history’ to be an element of the quotient H /Σ. One natural principle
says that L and L′ are equally good if they define the same probability distribution
over anonymous histories. Here is a convenient reformulation:
Posterior Anonymity. Given L,L′ ∈ L, suppose that L(U) = L′(U)
whenever U is a measurable, permutation-invariant subset of H. Then L ∼
L′.
In section 5.2.2 we will argue that this principle expresses a weak sense in which
the social preorder is ex post. Posterior Anonymity is easily seen to logically entail
Two-Stage Anonymity, and that is our preferred motivation for accepting the latter
as an axiom.8 However, a second motivation is available: Two-Stage Anonymity
follows from the combination of Anonymity and the central axiom of expected utility
theory, Strong Independence, or even its restriction to the indifference relation. The
fact that Two-Stage Anonymity is much weaker than the conjunction of Anonymity
and Strong Independence means that our aggregation theorems will be compatible
with many non-expected utility theories at both the individual and social levels.
7The standard Pareto and expected utility axioms mentioned in this section are formally
defined in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
8Posterior Anonymity itself follows from Anonymity and the widely accepted principle of Mono-
tonicity, provided the social preorder is upper-measurable, a common domain assumption needed
for Monotonicity to apply (see section 4.1). Anonymity is the case of Two-Stage Anonymity where
α = 1.
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1.3. The Aggregation Theorem.
Theorem 1.3.1. Given an arbitrary preorder %P on P, there is a unique preorder
% on L satisfying Anteriority, Reduction to Prospects, and Two-Stage Anonymity.
Namely,
(1) L % L′ ⇐⇒ pL %P pL′
where pL (similarly pL′) is the prospect
pL =
1
# I
∑
i∈I
Pi(L).
Proof. First let us show that if the social preorder satisfies the three conditions,
then it is has the form (1). Consider the lottery L1 :=
1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ σL. By repeated
application of Two-Stage Anonymity, we have
L =
1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ
L ∼ 1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ
σL = L1.
On the other hand, for any i ∈ I,
Pi(L1) = 1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ
Pi(σL) = 1
#Σ
∑
σ∈Σ
Pσ−1i(L) = pL.
By Anteriority, we must have L1 ∼ L(pL), and so L ∼ L(pL). Similarly, we will
have L′ ∼ L(pL′). Thus L % L′ if and only if L(pL) % L(pL′). By Reduction to
Prospects, the latter holds if and only if pL % pL′ .
Now we must check that, conversely, the social preorder defined by (1) necessarily
satisfies the three conditions. For Anteriority, suppose that Pi(L) = Pi(L′) for
every i ∈ I. Then clearly pL = pL′ , so L ∼ L′ by (1). As for Reduction to
Prospects, (1) gives L(P ) % L(P ′) if and only if pL(P ) %P pL(P ′). However, this
biconditional is equivalent to Reduction to Prospects since pL(P ) = P and pL(P ′) =
P ′. Finally, suppose given L,M, σ, α as in the statement of Two-Stage Anonymity.
To deduce from (1) that αL+ (1− α)M ∼ α(σL) + (1 − α)M , it suffices to show
that pαL+(1−α)M = pα(σL)+(1−α)M . It is easy to see that pL = pσL, and then we
can calculate
pαL+(1−α)M = αpL + (1− α)pM = αpσL + (1− α)pM = pα(σL)+(1−α)M .

Given that we favour Posterior Anonymity over and above Two-Stage Anonymity,
the following answers a natural question.
Proposition 1.3.2. The social preorders given by (1) satisfy Posterior Anonymity.
1.4. Terminology.
Definition 1.4.1. We will say that a social preorder % is generated by the indi-
vidual preorder %P whenever the constant population domain conditions (A)–(C)
hold and % satisfies (1).
Definition 1.4.2. Given two preordered spaces (X,%X) and (Y,%Y ), a function
f : X → Y represents %X (or is a representative of %X) when for all x1, x2 ∈ X,
x1 %X x2 ⇐⇒ f(x1) %Y f(x2).
The mere existence of a representative is trivial; let X = Y and f be the identity
mapping. The interesting case is where (Y,%Y ) is better behaved or easier to
understand or more fundamental than (X,%X). For example, Y may be Rn with the
natural order, the case with n = 1 being especially common. For another example,
the conclusion of Theorem 1.3.1 can be put by saying that the function L→ P given
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by L 7→ pL represents %. Alternatively, we will be much concerned with the case
where (Y,%Y ) is a preordered vector space (V,%V). By definition, this consists of
a vector space V with a preorder %V that is compatible with the linear structure
in the sense that, for any v, v′, w ∈ V and λ > 0, v %V v′ ⇐⇒ λv+w %V λv′ +w.
Preorders on vector spaces do not in general respect linear structure, so we will
say that a preorder %V on a vector space V is a vector preorder precisely when
(V,%V) is a preordered vector space. As we will explain in sections 3.3 and 3.4,
preordered vector spaces are particularly useful for making sense of very general
forms of utilitarian ‘total utility’ representations in the absence of continuity or
completeness assumptions.
When f is injective, we say that it is an embedding (of (X,%X) in (Y,%Y )).
When f is especially natural (for example, an inclusion), we say that%X is embedded
or included in %Y .
1.5. Examples. Now let us give some examples of corresponding individual and
social preorders. For concreteness and simplicity, we will take W to be the interval
[−10, 10] and take P to be the set of all finitely-supported probability measures on
W.
Example 1.5.1 (Utilitarianism). Suppose that%P orders P by expected value. (More
generally: suppose that %P is represented by the expected value of a utility function
on W.) The corresponding social preorder has utilitarian form. That is, L % L′ if
and only if L has greater expected total welfare. (Since we are here talking about a
fixed population I, there is no effective difference between total and average utilitar-
ianism.) As we explain in section 3.3, the social preorder will always have a broadly
utilitarian form whenever the individual preorder satisfies Strong Independence.
Example 1.5.2 (Leximin). Here the individual preorder satisfies Strong Indepen-
dence, but not the Archimedean continuity axiom. Let %P order P so that P %P P ′
if and only if either P = P ′ or the smallest x ∈ W at which P ({x}) 6= P ′({x}) is
such that P ({x}) < P ′({x}). When restricted to histories, the corresponding social
preorder is leximin: h  h′ if and only if the worst off individual in h is better off
than the worst off in h′; if they are tied, turn to the next worst off. This social
preorder is still ‘broadly utilitarian’ in the sense just mentioned, and which we elab-
orate in section 3.3: it turns out to be represented by a function which assigns to
each lottery its expected total utility in an infinite-dimensional preordered vector
space.
Example 1.5.3 (Incompleteness). Here the individual preorder satisfies Strong In-
dependence and the Archimedean axiom, but it is not in general complete. Let U
be a set of real-valued functions on W. Let %P preorder P so that P %P P ′ if and
only if, for all u in U , the expected value of u is at least as great under P as under
P ′. This individual preorder is not in general complete. The corresponding social
preorder ranks L % L′ if and only if, for each u in U , the expected total value of u
is at least as great under L as under L′. This social preorder is also not in general
complete.
Example 1.5.4 (Non-Separability). Finally, here is an example in which the individ-
ual preorder violates Strong Independence, even though it is complete and satisfies
the Archimedean axiom. This has interesting consequences for the social preorder.
Say that %P is a ‘rank-dependent’ individual preorder (RDI) if it has a ‘rank-
dependent utility’ representation.9 In other words, there is an increasing function
9 For an entry into the literature on this popular nonexpected utility theory, see e.g.
Wakker [105], Schmidt [97, §4.2], and Buchak [28, Ch. 2]. The function r is often required
to be continuous and strictly increasing, but the weaker definition will be useful.
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r : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], with r(0) = 0 and r(1) = 1, which we will call the ‘risk function’,
such that %P is represented by U : P→ R where
U(P ) := −10 +
∫ 10
−10
r(P ([x, 10]) dx.
If in addition r is convex, we will say that %P is ‘risk-avoidant’.10
Although U(1w) = w holds in general, and ordinary expected utility theory is
satisfied when r(x) = x, U(P ) is not in general simply the expected value of P . To
see the deviation from ordinary expected utility, assume for concreteness r(x) = x2.
In the following prospects, each listed welfare level has a probability of one quarter,
while the histories contain four people.
PA = [1, 1, 1, 1], PB = [5, 0, 1, 1], hA = [1, 1, 1, 1], hB = [5, 0, 1, 1]
PC = [1, 1, 0, 0], PD = [5, 0, 0, 0], hC = [1, 1, 0, 0], hD = [5, 0, 0, 0].
Computing the value of U for each prospect yields PA P PB and PD P PC . This
has the ‘paradoxical’ preference structure of the Allais paradox, violating Strong
Independence. For the corresponding social preorder, our aggregation theorem then
implies that hA  hB and hD  hC , violating Strong Separability.
Such violations of Strong Separability have been seen as expressions of egali-
tarianism. Thus it might be said that while the perfect equality in hA outweighs
the greater total welfare in hB , there is there is not much difference in inequal-
ity between hC and hD, so the greater total in hD is decisive (Sen [98, p. 41],
Broome [23]).
Returning to the general case, assume a population of size n. Say that a pre-
order % on histories is a rank-dependent social preorder (RDS) when for some
a1, . . . , an ≥ 0 and
∑
k ak = 1, % ranks a history h with welfare levels w1 ≤ w2 ≤
· · · ≤ wn according to the aggregate score
V (h) := a1w1 + a2w2 + · · ·+ anwn
If in addition a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an, we will say that % is ‘downwards increasing’.
Downward increasing RDSs are called ‘generalized Gini’ by Blackorby and Don-
aldson [12] and Weymark [107], who take them to be natural examples of egalitarian
preorders. We will say more about the relationship between apparently egalitarian
preorders and our aggregation theorems in section 5.1. But for now, by setting
ak = r(
n−k+1
n ) − r(n−kn ), we see that % is a [downwards increasing] RDS if and
only if it is generated by a [risk-avoidant] RDI. Thus what has been taken to be
a canonical form of egalitarianism at the social level emerges from what has been
characterized as ‘pessimism about risk’ at the individual level. For example, by
setting r(x) = 1 if x = 1, 0 otherwise, we obtain the social preorder on histories
given by the Rawlsian maximin rule.
The examples illustrate how distributive views which are traditionally seen as
very different can be obtained within our model simply by adjusting welfare com-
parisons at the individual level.11 General results corresponding to such possibilities
will be given in section 3.
2. A Variable Population Aggregation Theorem
In this section we present a version of the aggregation theorem in which the
population is allowed to vary from one history to another.
10This term is from Buchak [28, p. 66]; Yaari [109] and Chateauneuf and Cohen [31] use
‘pessimistic’.
11This echoes social choice theory, where, for example, classical utilitarianism and leximin
can be derived from common axioms except for different assumptions about the measurability of
welfare; see d’Aspremont and Gevers [5].
12 DAVID MCCARTHY, KALLE MIKKOLA, AND TERUJI THOMAS
2.1. Framework. At a basic level, the generalisation to variable populations is
straightforward: we simply introduce a new element Ω representing nonexistence,
and set W∗ := W∪{Ω}. This allows each history to represent some individuals as
nonexistent and, otherwise, Theorem 1.3.1 remains unchanged. To be sure, there
are some questions of interpretation. For example, we will speak of Ω as a welfare
level, but one need not take this literally. We will say more about comparisons
involving Ω in section 2.2 below.
The shortcoming of the approach just mentioned is there is only a finite set I
of possible individuals. The interesting generalisation is to allow the population
size to be unbounded. We will, however, insist that any given lottery involves
only finitely many individuals. We spell this out as assumption (D) below.12 In
comparing two lotteries, then, only a finite population will be relevant, and we can
apply the ideas of section 1. Only a little more work is required to ensure that these
pairwise comparisons combine into a well-defined social preorder. That is what we
now explain.
Thus let I∗ be an infinite set of possible individuals. Assume that W∗ and H∗ ⊂
(W∗)I∗ are measurable spaces, with Ω ∈ W∗, and that P∗ and L∗ are non-empty
convex sets of probability measures. We make the following domain assumptions,
in parallel to those of section 1.1.
(A). First, we assume that, for each i ∈ I∗, the projection W∗i : H∗ →W∗ is mea-
surable. This again allows us to define the function P∗i from lotteries to prospects,
so that P∗i (L)(U) = L((W∗i )−1(U)) for measurable U ⊂W∗.
We further assume that P∗i (L∗) ⊂ P∗.
(B). Second, for each w ∈ W∗ and each finite population I ⊂ I∗, we assume that
that our set H∗ of histories contains the history H∗I (w) such that
W∗i (H∗I (w)) =
{
w if i ∈ I
Ω if not.
We further assume that H∗I : W∗ → H∗ is measurable. We can then define a
corresponding function L∗I from prospects to lotteries. Thus if V is a measurable
subset of H∗, L∗I (P )(V ) = P ((H∗I )−1(V )).
We further assume that L∗I (P∗) ⊂ L∗.
(C). Third, we assume that H∗ is invariant under permutations of I∗. We write Σ∗
for the group of all such permutations.
We further assume that the action of Σ∗ on H∗ is measurable. This allows us to
define the action of Σ∗ on lotteries.
We further assume that L∗ is Σ∗-invariant.
(D). Finally, we assume that each history in H∗ and each lottery in L∗ involves
only finitely many individuals.
Let us explain what this means. For a history h, the assumption is thatW∗i (h) =
Ω for all but finitely many i ∈ I∗. One might guess that for a lottery L to ‘involve
only finitely many individuals’, it would suffice that Pi(L) = 1Ω for all but finitely
many i ∈ I∗. But this is not conceptually the right criterion, as the following
example shows.
12Aggregating the welfare of infinitely many individuals raises quite general and formidable
problems which we thus set aside. For example, full Anonymity is inconsistent with Strong Pareto.
See Bostrom [22] for an overview of such problems; Pivato [90] for a careful study of separable
aggregation in the infinite setting with applications to the present setting of risk; Zhou [110] for an
infinite-population version of Harsanyi’s original theorem (i.e. without interpersonal comparisons
and Anonymity); and McCarthy, Mikkola and Thomas [78] for an infinite-population version of
Harsanyi’s original theorem, but dispensing with continuity and completeness.
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Example 2.1.1. Suppose that I∗ = [0, 1], and let hi be the history in which only
individual i exists, with welfare level w. Let L be the uniform distribution over
these hi. Then each person i is certain not to exist – each has prospect 1Ω – yet
there is a clear sense in which L involves infinitely many individuals, rather than
no individuals. Namely, for any finite population I ⊂ I∗, it is certain that someone
not in I exists. One reason that this is problematic is that it would be natural to
reject Anteriority in this example. Anteriority would say that L is just as good as
no one existing at all, but intuitively it is rather as good as having one person who
is certain to exist at level w.
To state a better criterion, given finite I ⊂ I∗, let H∗I be the subset of H∗
consisting of histories h such that W∗i (h) = Ω for all i /∈ I. The assumption we
make for lotteries is that every L ∈ L∗ is supported on some H∗I . In other words,
there must exist some finite I ⊂ I∗ such that L(V ) = 0 whenever measurable V is
disjoint from H∗I . We write L
∗
I for the subset of L
∗ consisting of lotteries which are
supported on H∗I .
Note that, if I is contained in some larger population I′, then H∗I ⊂ H∗I′ , and any
lottery supported on H∗I is also a lottery supported on H
∗
I′ . Because of this, any
two lotteries in L∗ are members of some common L∗I , with I ⊂ I∗ finite.
Remark 2.1.2. The various measurability assumptions are again guaranteed if H∗
has the product sigma algebra with respect to the projections W∗i . However, it
would be natural to consider a finer-grained sigma algebra by including the sets
H∗I . Then L
∗
I would be the subset of L
∗ containing lotteries L such that L(H∗I ) = 1.
But we do not need this assumption.
The implications of the domain assumptions are illustrated by the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.1.3. Assume the domain conditions (A)–(D).
(i) Given L ∈ L∗I , we have P∗i (L) = 1Ω for any i ∈ I∗ \I. In particular, 1Ω ∈ P∗.
(ii) H∗ contains the ‘empty history’ hΩ such that W∗i (hΩ) = Ω for all i ∈ I∗.
(iii) L∗ contains the ‘empty lottery’ 1hΩ , and P∗i (1hΩ) = 1Ω for all i ∈ I∗.
(iv) Suppose {Ω} is measurable in W∗. If P∗i (L) = 1Ω for all i ∈ I∗, then L = 1hΩ .
2.2. Axioms for Aggregation. We let %P∗ be the individual preorder on P∗ and
%∗ be the social preorder on L∗.
The key axioms for the social preorder are much as before, with one minor change
due to the infinity of I∗. Anteriority works as before, but ‘Reduction to Prospects’
must be understood relative to each given finite population I:
Reduction to Prospects (Variable Population). For any P, P ′ ∈ P∗,
L∗I (P ) % L∗I (P ′) if and only if P %P∗ P ′.
Posterior Anonymity and Two-Stage Anonymity work as before, except that
they are understood in terms of Σ∗, the group of permutations of I∗.
In line with Theorem 1.3.1, those three axioms will turn out to be satisfied by
at most one social preorder. However, for such a social preorder to exist, we will
need a new condition on the individual preorder.13
Omega Independence. For any P, P ′ ∈ P∗ and rational number α ∈ (0, 1),
P %P∗ P ′ ⇐⇒ αP + (1− α)1Ω %P∗ αP ′ + (1− α)1Ω.
13We can in fact apply Theorem 1.3.1 to determine a unique social preorder on each L∗I
separately. The issue is whether these are compatible, in the sense of defining a social preorder
on L∗ as a whole.
14 DAVID MCCARTHY, KALLE MIKKOLA, AND TERUJI THOMAS
We will present a defence of this condition, and discuss its relation to other inde-
pendence axioms, in section 2.4.
A conceptual challenge for our approach is to provide an interpretation of %P∗ .
As in the constant population case, we assume that
(†) P∗i (L) %P∗ P∗j (L′) if and only if L is at least as good for i as L′ is for j
on the qualification that the individuals i and j are certain to exist under L and
L′ respectively. But in the presence of Reduction to Prospects (Variable), it would
be controversial to maintain that interpretation without the qualification. Two
examples will illustrate.
First, it has often been argued that existing at a given welfare level cannot be
better or worse for an individual than not existing at all. 14 A similar view arises
for comparisons between prospects in which Ω has positive probability. This is not
by itself a problem for us, since our framework allows Ω to be incomparable under
%P∗ with all, some, or no members of W. However, suppose that w is a very low
welfare level, corresponding to a life full of terrible suffering. One can maintain that
a history containing a single person at w is worse than the empty history, while
accepting that it is not worse for the sole person.
Second, it has also often been argued that there are lives which are worth living
which are nevertheless not worth creating (see e.g. Blackorby and Donaldson [13,
p. 21], and section 2.6 below). One possible version of this view would claim that
for some welfare level w, having w is better for someone than nonexistence even
though a history containing a single person at w is worse than the empty history.
Each of these positions clashes with Reduction to Prospects (Variable), if we
accept (†) without qualification. In response, it could be said that neither of the
positions is uncontroversial. For example, against the first view, the claim that
having welfare level w is worse for someone than nonexistence might be taken to
mean that having w harms the individual in an absolute rather than comparative
sense (see Bykvist [29, §2] for the relevant distinctions). Nevertheless, the existence
of such controversies suggests caution, and two comments will enable us to sidestep
these issues. First, we do not rely on any particular interpretation of %P∗ , as long
it makes plausible the axioms of our aggregation theorems. Second, at least one
such interpretation is available: one could identify %P∗ with the one-person social
preorder. Thus for any population I of size one, this position takes L∗I (P ) %∗
L∗I (P ′) ⇐⇒ P %P∗ P ′ to be a conceptual equivalence. This would leave open
the question of how %P∗ relates to betterness for individuals, and turn (†) into a
substantive claim which could be debated.15
2.3. The Aggregation Theorem.
Theorem 2.3.1. Given an individual preorder %P∗ , there is at most one social
preorder satisfying Anteriority, Reduction to Prospects (Variable Population), and
Two-Stage Anonymity. When it exists, it is given by
(2) L %∗ L′ ⇐⇒ pIL %P∗ pIL′
14See Broome [25, p.168] for one classic statement of this view.
15Hammond [59] essentially accepts the equivalence and (†) on conceptual grounds, and views
this as defining interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons in terms of the one-person social
preorder. This proposal stipulates away the two positions sketched in the text, and is consistent
with our approach, but not mandated by it.
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for finite non-empty I ⊂ I∗ such that L and L′ are lotteries in L∗I and where pIL
(similarly pIL′) is the prospect
pIL =
1
#I
∑
i∈I
P∗i (L).
It exists if and only if the individual preorder satisfies Omega Independence.
Proof. Once we have fixed I, the proof goes the same way as that of Theorem
1.3.1; for example, we define L1 and L
′
1 by summing over the group ΣI ⊂ Σ∗ of
permutations of I.
The only worry is that the comparison between L and L′ defined by (2) might
depend on I, and that is where Omega Independence comes in. In detail, if I ⊂ I′
and #I = m and #I′ = n, then
pI
′
L =
m
n
pIL +
n−m
n
1Ω.
Thus Omega Independence ensures that
pI
′
L % pI
′
L′ ⇐⇒ pIL % pIL′ .
To see that Omega Independence is a necessary condition, note that we can choose
I and I′ so that m/n equals any rational number α ∈ (0, 1). 
Definition 2.3.2. We will say that a social preorder %∗ is generated by the indi-
vidual preorder %P∗ whenever the variable population domain conditions (A)–(D)
hold and %∗ satisfies (2).
The social preorders described by Theorem 1.3.1 turned out to automatically
satisfy Posterior Anonymity. We can prove a similar result here, but we need a
technical assumption. Say that the sigma algebra on H∗ is coherent if the following
holds: U ⊂ H∗ is measurable if and only if U ∩ H∗I is measurable for every finite
I ⊂ I∗. Note that coherence is a trivial assumption, in the sense that one can
always expand the sigma algebra on H∗ to make it coherent without changing L∗
or invalidating any of the domain conditions.
Proposition 2.3.3. Suppose that the sigma algebra on H∗ is coherent. Then the
social preorders given by (2) satisfy Posterior Anonymity.
2.4. Constant vs Variable Population. We now show that the constant popu-
lation theorem is a special case of the variable population theorem, and offer several
reasons to think that Omega Independence is a fairly undemanding requirement.
To do this we need to be able to identify members of P with members of P∗.
Thus we assume that P is a (non-empty) convex set of probability measures on a
measurable space W, that W∗ = W∪{Ω}, and that W∗ has the sigma algebra gen-
erated by the one on W. This enables us to identify members of P with probability
measures on W∗ by the natural inclusion P 7→ P ∗, where P ∗(U) := P (U∩W) for all
measurable U in W∗. We then identify P∗ with the convex hull of PΩ := P∗ ∪{1Ω}.
We summarize these standing assumptions by saying that P∗ includes P.
We understand embeddings or inclusions of relevant preorders in terms of this
identification (see section 1.4). For example, %P∗ includes %P when for all P ,
P ′ ∈ P, P %P P ′ ⇐⇒ P %P∗ P ′.
A constant population model is any M = 〈I,W,P,%P,H,L,%〉 satisfying the
constant population domain conditions (A)–(C). A variable population model is
any M∗ = 〈I∗,W∗,P∗,%P∗ ,H∗,L∗,%∗〉 satisfying the variable population domain
conditions (A)–(D).
Assume that P∗ includes P. Given a variable population model M∗ and finite,
nonempty I ⊂ I∗, we define the restriction MI = 〈I,W,%P,HI,LI,%I〉 as follows.
16 DAVID MCCARTHY, KALLE MIKKOLA, AND TERUJI THOMAS
First, %P is the restriction of %P∗ to P. Second, H ⊂ WI is identified with the set
of histories h in H∗I such thatW∗i (h) 6= Ω for all i ∈ I, and equipped with the sigma
algebra induced by H∗. Third, the set of lotteries LI on HI is identified with the set
of lotteries L in L∗I such that P∗i (L) ∈ P for all i ∈ I. Finally, %I is the restriction of
%∗ to L. It is easy to show that MI is a constant population model. Conversely, we
say that M∗ includes a constant population model M just in case M is a restriction
of M∗.
Proposition 2.4.1. Assume that P∗ includes P.
Embedding %P in %P∗ . Suppose given a preorder %P. Let %PΩ be any preorder on
PΩ that includes %P.
(i) There is a preorder %P∗ on P∗ that includes %PΩ (and hence %P) and satisfies
Omega Independence.
(ii) There is a preorder %P∗ on P∗ that includes %PΩ (and hence %P) and violates
Omega Independence.
Embedding M in M∗.
(iii) For any variable population model M∗ satisfying (2) and finite I ⊂ I∗, the
restriction MI is a constant population model that satisfies (1).
(iv) For any constant population model M containing %P and satisfying (1), and
any Omega Independent %P∗ that includes %P, there is a variable population
model M∗ that includes M, contains %P∗ , and satisfies (2).
Part (i) is a consequence of the following very general result.
Theorem 2.4.2. Every preorder has a representation with values in a preordered
vector space.16
It shows that certain nonexistence can be slotted into any position in a given pre-
order %P, and the result can always be embedded in an Omega Independent %P∗ .
For example, Omega Independent %P∗ can be chosen so that for a given P ∈ P,
1Ω ∼P∗ P ; alternatively, Omega Independent %P∗ can be chosen so that 1Ω upriseP∗ P
for all P ∈ P. In permitting such a wide range of comparisons between nonexistence
and other welfare levels or prospects over such levels, this provides the first sense
in which Omega Independence is fairly undemanding.
Combining (i) with (iv) shows that any constant population model which sat-
isfies (1) can be extended to a variable population model which satisfies (2) in a
correspondingly wide range of ways. In conjunction with (iii), this articulates the
sense in which the constant population theorem is a special case of the variable
population theorem.
Parts (i) and (ii) show that no matter how nonexistence is compared with other
welfare levels, Omega Independence of %P∗ is logically independent of Strong In-
dependence of %P, despite the formal resemblance between these principles. In
particular, because of the qualitative distinction between nonexistence and other
welfare levels, anyone who is moved by something like the Allais paradox to reject
Strong Independence for %P might well accept Omega Independence for %P∗ . This
provides a second sense in which Omega Independence is fairly undemanding.
In fact, our variable population Theorem 2.3.1 gives strong reasons to accept
Omega Independence, and a third sense in which Omega Independence is reason-
ably modest. If the social preorder satisfies Anteriority, Reduction to Prospects
(Variable Population) and Two-Stage Anonymity, then the theorem tells us that
the individual preorder must satisfy Omega Independence. Since the first three
16This was defined in section 1.4. We will consider the structure of preordered vector spaces
in section 3.4, especially Theorem 3.4.5.
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premises are modest extensions of their constant population analogues, it is ar-
guable that the assumptions of Theorem 2.3.1 are hardly more difficult to defend
than those of Theorem 1.3.1, despite the fact that variable population problems
have been seen as challenging.
2.5. Examples. Let us show how some of the examples from section 1.5 can be
extended to variable populations. Among other things this will illustrate part (a)(i)
of Proposition 2.4.1. Although we present some general constructions, we focus on
the extension of constant population utilitarianism (Example 1.5.1) to the variable
case. As in section 1.5, we take W = [−10, 10] and let P∗ consist of all finitely
supported probability measures on W∗ = W∪{Ω}.
Example 2.5.1 (Critical Level Utilitarianism). A ‘critical level for a history h’ is a
welfare level c ∈ W such that adding one extra person to h at welfare level c is a
matter of social indifference. For example, if 1c ∼P∗ 1Ω, then c is a critical level for
the empty history. It does not follow that c is a ‘critical level’; that is, a welfare
level such that adding someone at c to any history is a matter of social indifference.
But c would be a critical level if we assumed that it is equivalent to Ω in a stronger
sense. That is, given P , P ′ ∈ P and α, α′ ∈ [0, 1],
αP + (1− α)1Ω %P∗ α′P ′ + (1− α′)1Ω
⇐⇒ αP + (1− α)1c %P α′P ′ + (1− α′)1c.
Suppose that %P satisfies Strong Independence. Then %P∗ satisfies Omega Indepen-
dence includes %P, and c is a critical level under the assumptions of Theorem 2.3.1.
When we apply this definition of %P∗ in the case of constant population utilitari-
anism, the corresponding variable population social preorder has the form of critical
level utilitarianism. That is, define a utility function u on W by u(w) = w − c.
Then L %∗ L′ if and only if L has greater expected total u.17 The case of stan-
dard total utilitarianism is when c coincides with the welfare level of lives that are
neutral (neither good nor bad) for the individual living them. If one is skeptical
of the notion of a neutral life, then one may also be skeptical that there is such a
canonical version of total utilitarianism.
Example 2.5.2 (Average Utilitarianism and Value Conditional on Existence). Here
is a second way to embed %P in a preorder %P∗ satisfying Omega Independence,
whether or not %P satisfies Strong Independence. The idea is that certain nonex-
istence is incomparable to any other prospect, while in other cases the value of a
prospect P is to be identified with its value conditional on the existence of the
individual.18 So define %P∗ by the rule that, given P, P ′ ∈ P and α, α′ ∈ [0, 1],
αP + (1− α)1Ω %P∗ α′P ′ + (1− α′)1Ω ⇐⇒
{
α, α′ > 0 and P %P P ′, or
α = α′ = 0.
In the case of constant population utilitarianism, the resulting variable popu-
lation social preorder is a version of average utilitarianism. It ranks lotteries by
expected total welfare divided by expected population size. (The ‘empty’ lottery
in which it is certain that no one exists is incomparable to the others.)
Two other ways of modeling the idea that value is conditional on existence lead
to more obvious versions of average utilitarianism, but these are less well behaved.
Ranking lotteries by expected average welfare violates Anteriority. Alternatively,
let expected welfare be understood as expected welfare conditional upon existence,
17This position is defended by Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson in a number of places, such
as Blackorby et al [17], and under the name ‘the standardized total principle’, by Broome [26].
18Such an idea is emphasised, for example, by Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve [54], and also seemingly
endorsed by Harsanyi in his correspondence with Ng [86].
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and take the average of expected welfare over individuals with a non-zero chance of
existence. Ranking lotteries by average expected welfare then violates Two-Stage
Anonymity.
Example 2.5.3 (Incomparability of Nonexistence). A third method of defining %P∗
may appeal to those who take to heart the view mentioned in section 2.2 that
nonexistence is incomparable to other welfare levels. For P, P ′ ∈ P and α, α′ ∈ [0, 1],
they may define
αP + (1− α)1Ω %P∗ α′P ′ + (1− α′)1Ω ⇐⇒
{
α = α′ > 0 and P %P P ′, or
α = α′ = 0.
This invariably produces an individual preorder satisfying Omega Independence.
However, it leads to widespread social incomparability: we will have Luprise∗ L′ unless
the expected population size under L equals that under L′. If we extend constant
population utilitarianism in this way, then the social preorder ranks lotteries of a
given expected population size by their expected total utility – or, equivalently, by
expected total utility divided by expected population size, as in Example 2.5.2.
2.6. The Repugnant Conclusion. A great deal of discussion of variable-popula-
tion aggregation has centred around the ‘Repugnant Conclusion’ of Parfit [88]. This
is the statement that for any history in which every individual has the same very
high welfare level, there is a better history containing more people in which every
individual has the same very low welfare level, corresponding to a life barely worth
living. For example, this is a consequence of standard total utilitarianism, with the
understanding that ‘barely worth living’ lives have positive utility. Many people find
the Repugnant Conclusion, or variations on it, as repugnant as the name suggests
(see e.g. Parfit [88]; Hammond [58]; Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [14]). In
what follows, let w0 be the welfare level of a life that is barely worth living, and W
a much higher welfare level, representing an excellent quality of life. Let Pα be the
prospect α1W + (1− α)1Ω, for α ∈ [0, 1].
Under the conditions of our aggregation theorem, the Repugnant Conclusion
amounts to the claim that 1w0 P∗ Pα, for some rational probability α > 0. There
are, at least formally, many ways in which this claim about prospects can be de-
nied. This illustrates the extent to which social preorders satisfying the aggregation
theorem can deviate from total utilitarianism. We will study such deviations sys-
tematically in sections 3 and 4, but it may be useful to give a less formal preview
from the point of view of the Repugnant Conclusion.
As we explain in section 3.3, especially Proposition 3.4.2, the social preorder has
an additive representation like that of total utilitarianism as long as the individual
preorder satisfies the Strong Independence axiom. However, even accepting Strong
Independence, there are still several natural approaches to avoiding the Repugnant
Conclusion.
First, we can hold that Pα %P∗ 1w0 for all α ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, for α = 0,
1Ω %P∗ 1w0 . Thus if 1c ∼P∗ 1Ω, we have a version of critical level utilitarianism in
which the critical level c is at least w0. Note, though, that there is some tension
between accepting this comparison and claiming that w0 is ‘worth living’.
Second, it is possible to maintain that Pα %P∗ 1w0 for every α > 0, but, corre-
sponding to α = 0, 1w0 P∗ 1Ω. This requires that the individual preorder violate
the Archimedean axiom, and naturally suggests that the value difference between
W and Ω is ‘infinitely greater’ than the one between w0 and Ω. On this kind of
theory, lives at level w0 contribute positively to the social value of a population,
but no number of lives at level w0 can contribute more than even one life at level
W .
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Finally, we can continue to deny that 1w0 P∗ Pα for any α > 0, but allow that
1w0 upriseP∗ Wα for some α. Thus we allow the individual preorder to be incomplete.
On the most natural version of this view, the incomparability holds for all α small
enough, and, in particular, 1w0 upriseP∗ 1Ω. This is the kind of theory developed by
Broome [26] and Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [17]. In terms of the Repugnant
Conclusion, the theory holds that some population at level W is not worse than
any population at level w0, although such populations may be incomparable if the
latter is sufficiently large.
The second and third approaches just discussed involve violations of expected
utility theory for the individual and social preorders. Although we will not make
a broader evaluation of these approaches, the Repugnant Conclusion and similar
issues provide a reason to consider such violations, as we do in section 3. In par-
ticular, section 3.4 provides a general characterization of the situation in which the
individual preorder satisfies Strong Independence, but is allowed to violate com-
pleteness and the Archimedean axiom.
3. Expected utility
Given a view about the social preorder, one might ask what it implies about the
individual preorder. To use examples already given, one might ask which classes of
individual preorder generate given classes of apparently egalitarian social preorders,
or avoid the Repugnant conclusion. Answering such questions could be seen as a
kind of reverse engineering. But we now focus on the opposite direction: what can
be said about the social preorder, given that the individual preorder satisfies various
standard conditions? This project is prompted by the view, often expressed in social
choice theory, that it is better to impose conditions on the individual preorder and
then derive them for the social preorder, rather than impose them directly on the
social preorder. Section 5.3 will give a concrete example to illustrate why; first we
give general results.
One of the key features of our approach is that it is compatible with a wide
variety of both expected and non-expected utility theories. The next section looks
at the latter, while this section examines the former. Section 3.1 shows that the
social preorder inherits (properties expressed by) the most normatively central ex-
pected utility axioms from the individual preorder, in the sense that under the
conditions of our aggregation theorems, if the individual preorder satisfies a given
axiom, then so does the social preorder. Perhaps more strikingly, section 3.2 shows
the equivalence (under the aggregation theorems) of various Pareto, independence,
and separability axioms. This illustrates how conditions on the individual preorder
restrain how the value of lotteries depends aggregatively on the value of prospects.
Section 3.3 shows that the social preorder inherits a variety of expected-utility-style
integral representations from the individual preorder. One of these is fairly general,
allowing for failures of both continuity and completeness. Section 3.4 shows that
the recognizably ‘Harsanyi-like’ flavour of these results can be generalized still fur-
ther. In particular, the main result of this section is that a social preorder which
satisfies the conditions of our aggregation theorems has a Harsanyi-like ‘total util-
ity’ mixture-preserving representation in a preordered vector space if and only if
it is generated by an individual preorder that satisfies Strong Independence. We
then show that this result can be expressed in terms of a lexicographic mixture-
preserving representation involving a family of real-valued utility functions. This
result rests on what appears to be a new fundamental structure theorem for pre-
ordered vector spaces. Section 3.5 sums up the initial case for defining utilitarian
social preorders to be precisely those social preorders generated by individual pre-
orders which satisfy Strong Independence. We mostly state results in the more
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general variable population setting only. In such cases, analogous results for the
constant population case are easily obtained.
3.1. Axioms. At the heart of expected utility theory is the notion of independence.
Several different independence axioms are possible, and, like other axioms from
expected utility theory, they can be posited separately for either the individual or
the social preorder. Thus we state them generically for a preorder %X on a convex
set X.
Independence axioms. Suppose given p, p′, q ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1).
(Ia) p ∼X p′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q ∼X αp′ + (1− α)q.
(Ib) p X p′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q X αp′ + (1− α)q.
(Ic) pupriseX p′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q upriseX αp′ + (1− α)q.
Let (I1) := (Ia), (I2) := (Ia) ∧ (Ib), and (I3) := (Ia) ∧ (Ib) ∧ (Ic). These seem to be
the reasonable packages of independence axioms. In particular, (I3) is equivalent
to perhaps the best known independence axiom, Strong Independence, that is,
p %X p′ ⇐⇒ αp+ (1− α)q %X αp′ + (1− α)q.
Just as Omega Independence only quantified over scalars in (0, 1) ∩ Q, we sim-
ilarly define the Rational Independence axioms (IQi ) for i = 1, . . . , 3 as the corre-
sponding independence axioms, but with α restricted to (0, 1) ∩ Q. Contrary to
what has sometimes been claimed, (Ii) and (I
Q
i ) strictly increase in strength with i.
The following complete the main expected utility axioms.
Ordering (O). %X is an ordering (a complete preorder).
Archimedean axiom (Ar). For all p, q, r ∈ X, p X q X r implies that
there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αp+(1−α)r X q and q X βp+(1−β)r.
Given (I3) and (O), (Ar) is equivalent to the following axiom, which may, however,
be more natural than (Ar) when %X is incomplete.19
Mixture Continuity (MC). For all p, q, r ∈ X, the set {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp +
(1−α)r %X q} is closed in [0, 1], as is the set {α ∈ [0, 1] : q %X αp+(1−α)r}.
When X is equipped with a topology, many continuity conditions typically stronger
than (MC) have been considered. The following is the most popular.
Continuity (C). {p ∈ X : p %X q} and {p ∈ X : q %X p} are closed for all
q ∈ X.
One can only expect nice results about (C) if the basic operations on prospects
and lotteries are themselves continuous. Say that mixing is continuous on X if for
any λ ∈ (0, 1), λp + (1 − λ)q is a continuous function of p, q ∈ X. In the constant
population case, the basic assumption is as follows.
Topology (Top). P and L have topologies such that L and all the maps Pi
are continuous, and mixing is continuous on P.
In the variable population case, we need a further condition on the topology of L∗
that allows us to pass from continuity on each L∗I to continuity on L
∗ itself. Say
that L∗ is topologically coherent if it satisfies the following condition: U ⊂ L∗ is
closed if and only if U ∩ L∗I is closed in L∗I for every I. (Here L∗I has a topology as
a subspace of L∗.) As a standard example, suppose that W∗ is a topological space,
and each H∗I has the product topology. Using the Borel sigma algebras, we can
give P∗ the weak topology, and define the topology on L∗ by the condition that U
19See Dubra [46] for a discussion of the relationship between (Ar) and (MC) (or ‘Herstein-
Milnor continuity’).
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is closed if and only if U ∩ L∗I is closed in the weak topology on L∗I , for every I.20
Thus in the variable population case we use
Topology (Variable Population) (Top∗). P∗ and L∗ have topologies such
that all the maps LI and P∗i are continuous, mixing is continuous on P∗, and
L∗ is topologically coherent.
Proposition 3.1.1 (Inheritance).
Constant Population. Suppose that % is generated by %P. Then
(i) Each of (O), (Ii), (I
Q
i ), (Ar), and (MC), i = 1, 2, 3, is satisfied by % if and
only if it is satisfied by %P .
(ii) Assuming (Top), % satisfies (C) if and only %P does.
Variable Population. Suppose that %∗ is generated by %P∗ . Then
(iii) Each of (O), (Ii), (I
Q
i ), (Ar), and (MC), i = 1, 2, 3, is satisfied by %∗ if and
only if it is satisfied by %P∗ .
(iv) Assuming (Top∗), %∗ satisfies (C) if and only %P∗ does.
Thus the most normatively central expected utility axioms are all inherited by the
social preorder. Similar results hold for many other normatively natural expected
utility axioms.21
3.2. Pareto, separability, and independence. We will continue to consider
both constant and variable population settings. However, even in the constant
population setting, the next result is most striking, and easiest to state, if we
consider a family of constant population models with populations of different sizes.
If one accepts the assumptions of Theorem 1.3.1 for one constant population, it is
natural to accept them for every constant population. The same goes for various
conditions like Pareto or Separability (to be formulated below).
Formally, suppose given a set of welfare levels Wg, a convex set of prospects Pg,
and an individual preorder %Pg . (The superscript g stands for ‘generic’, for reasons
to appear momentarily.) Also assume given an infinite population I∗. Then a
family F of constant population models consists of a constant population model
〈I,Wg,Pg,%Pg ,HI,LI,%I〉 for each finite I ⊂ I∗. Note that Wg, Pg, and %Pg are
independent of I.
In fact, this framework is generic between constant and variable population set-
tings, in the following way. Given a variable population model, we can define
Wg = W∗, Pg = P∗, %Pg=%P∗ , HI = H∗I , LI = L∗I , and let %I be the restriction
of %∗ to L∗I . The result is formally a ‘family of constant population models’, even
though the set Wg of welfare levels includes Ω. In this way, results about families
of constant population models immediately imply results about variable population
models.
With this background, let us consider Pareto and Separability conditions on a
family F . Because the individual preorder can be incomplete, Pareto conditions
need to be defined with some care.
20It does not follow automatically that the topology on L∗I as a subspace of L
∗ equals the weak
topology, as one might wish. But this does follow if {1Ω} is closed in P∗, which is guaranteed e.g.
if W∗ is metrizable [20, Corollary 8.2.4].
21For example, the social preorder also inherits various finite dominance axioms, and suitably
restricted countable dominance axioms (cf. Fishburn [50] and Hammond [61]); the restriction
arises because L or L∗ may not be closed under countable mixing operations. In the topological
setting, other continuity conditions may be of interest, such as the one Dubra, Maccheroni and
Ok [47] use to obtain an EUT representation for incomplete preorders. It is again easy to see
that this condition is inherited in the constant population case, but we do not know whether it is
inherited in by %∗. (Note, though, that various forms of EUT representation are inherited, as in
Proposition 3.3.1 below.)
22 DAVID MCCARTHY, KALLE MIKKOLA, AND TERUJI THOMAS
We first define ≈JPg , BJPg and ./JPg . For any lotteries L and L′ in LI and J ⊂ I:
L ≈JPg L′ ⇐⇒ Pi(L) ∼Pg Pi(L′) for all i ∈ J
LBJPg L′ ⇐⇒ Pi(L) Pg Pi(L′) for all i ∈ J
L ./JPg L
′ ⇐⇒ Pi(L)uprisePg Pi(L′),Pi(L) ∼Pg Pj(L), and
Pi(L′) ∼Pg Pj(L′) for all i, j ∈ J
We might read ≈JPg , BJPg and ./JPg as, respectively, equally good, better, and equi-
incomparable for all members of J. To explain the last of these, suppose I = {1, 2}
and consider the inference: Pi(L) uprisePg Pi(L′) for i = 1, 2 =⇒ L upriseI L′. This may
seem natural: if L and L′ are incomparable for both 1 and 2, they are incomparable.
But suppose Wg includes welfare levels a and b, and define histories h = [a, b]
and h′ = [b, a]. Treating welfare levels and histories as degenerate prospects and
lotteries, suppose a uprisePg b. Then the inference just considered implies h upriseI h′. But
this violates any standard formulation of anonymity (in our framework, Two-Stage
Anonymity). The use of ./JPg in the following blocks this kind of inference.
Pareto axioms. Suppose given I ⊂ I∗, L,L′ ∈ LI, and a partition I = JunionsqK
with J 6= ∅.
(Pa) L ≈IPg L′ =⇒ L ∼I L′.
(Pb) LBJPg L′ and L ≈KPg L′ =⇒ L I L′.
(Pc) L ./
J
Pg L
′ and L ≈KPg L′ =⇒ LupriseI L′.
We will focus on the natural packages (P1) := (Pa), (P2) := (Pa) ∧ (Pb), and
(P3) := (Pa) ∧ (Pb) ∧ (Pc). Some of these have familiar names. (P1) is Pareto
Indifference; (P2) is known as Strong Pareto, though we will shortly question this
label; but (P3) appears to be novel.
Separability assumptions only make sense under some further domain conditions.
Suppose that we have finite populations J ⊂ I. We want to be able to ‘restrict’
lotteries in LI to the subpopulation J. There is a natural projection (W)I → (W)J.
We have to assume that this restricts to a measurable function HI → HJ, resulting
in a function LI → LJ. This maps a lottery L ∈ LI to its restriction L|J. Thus the
following axioms presuppose that, in this sense, restrictions exist.
Separability axioms. Suppose given I ⊂ I∗, L,L′ ∈ LI, and a partition
I = J unionsqK with J 6= ∅.
(Sa) L|M ∼J L′|M and L|K ∼K L′|K =⇒ L ∼I L′.
(Sb) L|M J L′|M and L|K ∼K L′|K =⇒ L I L′.
(Sc) L|M upriseJ L′|M and L|K ∼K L′|K =⇒ LupriseI L′.
We consider the natural combinations (S1) := (Sa), (S2) := (Sa)∧ (Sb), and (S3) :=
(Sa) ∧ (Sb) ∧ (Sc). When L|K ∼K L′|K, (S3) says that the members of K can be
ignored in the comparison between L and L′. That is to say, L %I L′ ⇐⇒ L|J %J
L′|J. Thus (S3) can be seen as an axiom of strong separability across individuals.
Separability is most interesting when the lotteries faced by J and K can vary
independently. As a weak form of this independence, say that the family of models
is compositional if, for any partition I = J unionsq K, and any P,Q ∈ Pg, there exists
L ∈ LI such that Pj(L) = P for all j ∈ J and Pk(L) = Q for all k ∈ K. For example,
the family is compositional if each H∗I = (W
∗)I is equipped with the product sigma
algebra and LI is the set of all lotteries on HI (Bogachev [20, Theorem 3.3.1]).
Proposition 3.2.1 (Equivalence of Pareto, Separability, and Independence). Sup-
pose that each social preorder %I in the family F is generated by %Pg . Suppose that
restrictions exist and that F is compositional. Then, for i = 1, 2, 3:
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F satisfies (Si) ⇐⇒ F satisfies (Pi) ⇐⇒
every %I satisfies (IQi ) ⇐⇒ %Pg satisfies (IQi ).
Moreover, if F is obtained from a variable population model, we can omit the as-
sumption that F is compositional.
This result has several lessons. First, given our aggregation theorems, there is
no real normative difference between Pareto, separability, and independence. This
more or less follows even from the basic constant population case. For example,
fix a population of size n, assume that %P generates %, and restrict the domain
assumptions of the proposition accordingly. Then the proof of the proposition shows
that if % satisfies the Pareto condition (P3), then %P satisfies the the independence
condition (I3) for all α =
m
n ∈ (0, 1). When n is large, it is difficult to believe that
there could be a normative case for accepting (P3) but rejecting the unrestricted
version of (I3). From a technical point of view, however, (I3) is a more appealing
condition. It only takes a very weak continuity assumption to pass from (IQ3 ) to
(I3), but on the other hand, the right to left direction of the equivalences in the
proposition hold without assuming F is compositional. In the sequel we present
results which assume that the individual preorder satisfies (I3). If one preferred,
one could instead use (S3) or (P3), along with the needed domain conditions and
the weak continuity assumption. To anticipate, this could be used to provide an
derivation of the conclusion of Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem without assuming
independence at either the individual or the social level.22
Second, the complications concerning incomparability and Pareto discussed in
section 3.2 suggest caution in claiming that (P3) is the right way of extending the
usual (P2) Pareto condition to say something ‘Pareto-style’ about incomparability.
One question is whether (P3) is plausible, and the crucial issue is the status of its
component (Pc). Suppose first that K in the statement of (Pc) is empty. Then
(Pc) is entailed by the conjunction of (P1) and the following plausible principle:
P upriseP∗ P ′ =⇒ L∗I (P ) uprise∗ L∗I (P ′). In the general case where K can be non-empty,
(Pc) is then motivated by the kind of separability principle which underlies (Pb),
that of ignoring groups of indifferent individuals. The next question is whether
(P3) is sufficiently strong. But ignoring technicalities, Proposition 3.2.1 shows that
under the conditions of our aggregation theorems, each (Pi) is equivalent to the
corresponding (Ii) for i = 1, 2, 3. Since (I3) is so well-established, this suggests
that (P3) is both natural and appropriately strong. Terminology is unfortunate,
however; while (I3) is Strong Independence, and (S3) is a principle of strong sepa-
rability, it is (P2) which is customarily referred to as Strong Pareto. We suggest,
rather, that it is the strictly stronger (P3) which should be called Strong Pareto.
Third, our aggregation theorems are compatible with the adoption of any non-
expected utility theory for the individual preorder, provided only that Omega In-
dependence is satisfied in the variable population case. This allows nonexpected
utility theory to be easily inserted into a mainstream approach to aggregation. But
Proposition 3.2.1 reveals a potential cost. Nonexpected utility theories typically
reject every independence axiom. But given the assumptions of Theorem 2.3.1,
rejecting any independence axiom requires rejecting the dual Pareto axiom. To
its critics, this may be a further strike against nonexpected utility theory; to its
defenders, it may be evidence for a hidden problem with Pareto.
3.3. Expected utility representations. Our aggregation theorems are neutral
about whether the individual preorder satisfies (I3), that is, Strong Independence.
22Compare Mongin and Pivato [84, p. 159] for a similar observation in a different informational
framework, and see also Pivato [90, pp.39–40].
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But (I3) is widely regarded as plausible, so we now begin further investigation of
social preorders generated by individual preorders that satisfy (I3).
This section focuses on expected-utility-style integral representations. We state
these in terms of the generic preorder %X on a convex set X, but we further assume
X = P(Y ) for some convex set of probability measures P(Y ) on a set Y equipped
with a sigma algebra. We say that u : Y → R is P(Y )-integrable just in case it is
measurable and Lebesgue integrable with respect to all p ∈ P(Y ). The basic form
of an expected utility representation is as follows.
EUT There is a P(Y )-integrable function u such that U : P(Y )→ R, defined
by U(p) =
∫
Y
u dp, represents %X .
But there are a number of ways in which %X can violate EUT. First, if %X violates
the relatively weak continuity conditions (Ar) or (MC), it cannot satisfy EUT, but
it may have a vector-valued expected-utility-style representation. The vector space
can be preordered, allowing for the possibility that %X violates (O) as well as (MC).
Here is the general set-up. First, recall from section 1.4 that a preordered vector
space is a vector space V with a preorder%V such that v %V v′ ⇐⇒ λv+w %V λv′+
w, for all V, v′, w ∈ V and λ > 0. So R with the standard ordering is an example.
Second, we need a way of integrating V-valued functions. Suppose we have a set A
of linear functionals on V that separates the points of V. A function u : Y → V is
weakly P(Y )-integrable (with respect to A) if there exists U : P(Y )→ V such that∫
Y
Λ ◦ u dp = Λ ◦U(p) for all Λ ∈ A, p ∈ P(Y ). (In particular, every Λ ◦ u must be
P(Y )-integrable.) In this case we write U(p) = ∫
Y
u dp.23
Vector-EUT For some preordered vector space (V,%V) and A a separating
set of linear functionals on V, there is a weakly P(Y )-integrable function
u : Y → V such that U(p) = ∫
Y
u dp represents %X .
Ordinary EUT is the special case where V = R, %V is the standard ordering, and
A contains only the identity map R→ R.
The following propositions say that the social preorder inherits both EUT and
vector-EUT representations from the individual preorder. Moreover, the social
preorder is represented by expected total utility.
Proposition 3.3.1 (EUT Inheritance).
Constant Population. Suppose the social preorder % is generated by %P.
(i) Then %P satisfies EUT or Vector EUT if and only if % does too.
(ii) In either case, if %P is represented by U(p) =
∫
W u dp, then % is represented
by V (L) =
∫
H
∑
i∈I(u ◦Wi) dL.
Variable Population. Suppose the social preorder %∗ is generated by %P∗ .
(iii) Then %P∗ satisfies EUT or Vector EUT if and only if %∗ does too.
(iv) In either case, if %P∗ is represented by U(p) =
∫
W∗ u dp, then %∗ is represented
by V (L) =
∫
H∗
∑
i∈I∗(u ◦W∗i − u(Ω)) dL.
The u(Ω) appearing in Proposition 3.3.1(iv) is needed to ensure that the sum has
finitely many non-zero terms. Since, given u, %P∗ also satisfies EUT with respect
to u − u(Ω), this can be seen as merely normalising the utility function to have
value zero at Ω. If there is a c ∈W such that 1c ∼P∗ 1Ω (there need not be), then
c is a critical level, and u(c) = u(Ω). Informally, however, we will speak of u(Ω)
itself as a critical level.
23This integral is the weak (or Pettis) integral corresponding to the (locally convex) topological
vector space whose topology is induced by A (Rudin [94, 3.10]). We will therefore refer to it as
the weak integral. If V = RN , with N an arbitrary set, and A is the set of projections x 7→ xi,
i ∈ N , then this is the coordinatewise integral.
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A popular approach to handling failures of (O) is to look for a set U of P(Y )-
integrable utility functions mapping Y to a completely preordered vector space
(V,%V) such that p %X p′ ⇐⇒ (∀u ∈ U)(
∫
Y
u dp %V
∫
Y
u dp′) in the appropriate
sense of integration.24 Any such so-called ‘multi-[vector] EUT’ representation of the
individual preorder will be inherited by the social preorder; just apply Proposition
3.3.1 to one u ∈ U at a time.
However, although multi-representations may be technically and heuristically
useful, they do not really provide further generality as they convert to special cases
of vector EUT representations. For write U = {ui | i ∈ I} for some index set I.
Let (V+,%V+) be the preordered vector space where V+ := VI and x %V+ y ⇐⇒
(∀i ∈ I)(xi %V yi). Let A be the set of projections x 7→ xi on V+. Define weakly
P(Y )-integrable (with respect to A) u+ : Y → V+ by setting (u+(y))i = ui(y).
Then U+(p) :=
∫
Y
u+dp is a vector EUT representation of %X .
In the ordinary EUT version, the claim that the social preorder is represented
by V (L) =
∫
H
∑
i∈I(u ◦Wi) dp is the conclusion of Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem.
The considerably more general vector EUT version allows for failures of continuity
and completeness, but maintains the ‘total utility’ form. Total utility representa-
tions are also preserved in the V (L) =
∫
H∗
∑
i∈I∗(u ◦W∗i − u(Ω)) dL representation
in the variable population case, in both the ordinary and vector EUT cases. Propo-
sition 3.3.1 shows that these representations arise from the assumptions of our
aggregation theorems combined with a simple further assumption about the indi-
vidual preorder. But it will turn out that even more general ‘Harsanyi-like’ total
utility representations can be obtained from our aggregation theorems.
3.4. Mixture-preserving representations. Without going into details, the ex-
istence of integral expected-utility-style representations typically depends upon the
individual preorder satisfying normatively natural axioms, like those in section 3.1,
together with technical or structural conditions. If the latter fail, there may be
no such representation.25 By contrast, our aggregation theorems do not rely upon
the individual or social preorders having any such representation. For example,
Theorem 2.3.1 explicitly characterizes the social preorder in terms of the individual
preorder, and Proposition 3.1.1 adds that if the individual preorder satisfies the
normatively central expected utility axioms (O), (Ar) and (I3), then so does the
social preorder. This is also shown by Proposition 3.3.1, but only with further
technical assumptions.
Nevertheless, we can bridge these two styles of results if we generalize the notion
of an expected-utility-style representation. In particular, we allow utility functions
to be vector-valued, require them to be mixture-preserving, but do not insist on
an integral representation. Thus, a mixture-preserving (MP) representation of %X
is a mixture-preserving map U : X → V to a preordered vector space (V,%V) such
that x %X y ⇐⇒ U(x) %V U(y).
Theorem 3.4.1. %X satisfies (I3) if and only if it has an MP representation.
(Compare this with Theorem 2.4.2. (I3) corresponds exactly to mixture-preserva-
tion.)
The theorem applies in particular to X = P∗. (For brevity we focus on the vari-
able population case, the constant population case being exactly parallel.) More-
over:
24The case where (V,%V) = (R,≥) is discussed in Baucells and Shapley [8], Dubra, Maccheroni
and Ok [47]; and Evren [49].
25See e.g. Fishburn [50] and Dillenberger and Krishna [43] for discussion.
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Proposition 3.4.2. Suppose %P∗ generates %∗. Then %P∗ has an MP represen-
tation (i.e. satisfies (I3)) if and only if %∗ does. More precisely, if U is an MP
representation of %P∗ , then
∑
i∈I∗(U ◦P∗i −U(1Ω)) is an MP representation of %∗.
In many ways, this is the best result of section 3, and we could finish it here. First,
it shows that we obtain an extremely general Harsanyi-like ‘total utility’ mixture-
preserving representation of the social preorder based merely on the assumption
that the individual preorder satisfies (I3). It is worth remarking that the conceptual
import of additive representations has often been taken to be separability (see e.g.
Blackorby et al. [14]). In our framework, Proposition 3.2.1 shows that separability
is all but equivalent to (I3). Second, Propostion 3.4.2 opens up the use of theorems
concerning preordered vector spaces to further analyze the social preorder.
In particular, we can apply structure theorems for preordered vector spaces to
reinterpret an MP representation as a family of more familiar real-valued represen-
tations. Informally, elements of the value space V can be represented by matrices
of real numbers. The space of row-vectors is lexicographically ordered, and one
matrix ranks higher than another if and only if it ranks higher in each row.
Formally, a lexicographic mixture-preserving (LMP) representation of %X con-
sists of a family {Uab} of mixture-preserving functions X → R, indexed by a in
a set R (for ‘rows’) and b in a completely ordered set C (for ‘columns’). It must
satisfy the following two conditions for all p, q ∈ X:
LMP1. For each a ∈ R, either Uab(p) = Uab(q) for all b ∈ C, or there is a largest
b ∈ C such that Uab(p) 6= Uab(q).
LMP2. We have p %X q if and only if, for each a ∈ R, either Uab(p) = Uab(q) for all
b ∈ C, or Uab(p) > Uab(q) for the largest b ∈ C such that Uab(p) 6= Uab(q).
Theorem 3.4.3. %X satisfies (I3) if and only if it has an LMP representation. It
satisfies (I3) and (O) if and only if it has an LMP representation with #R = 1. It
satisfies (I3) and (MC) if and only if it has an LMP representation with #C = 1.
And it satisfies (I3), (O), and (MC) if and only if it has an LMP representation
with #R = #C = 1.
This shows, in particular, that the three main axioms of EUT are jointly equivalent
to having a representation by a single mixture-preserving function X → R. Note
also the special role of (MC) rather than (Ar).
The theorem applies in particular for X = P∗. Moreover, in parallel to Proposi-
tion 3.4.2, we have:
Proposition 3.4.4. Suppose %∗ is generated by %P∗ . Then %P∗ has an LMP
representation (i.e. it satisfies (I3)) if and only if %∗ does. More precisely, if {Uab}
is an LMP representation of %P∗ , then {
∑
i∈I∗(Uab ◦ W∗i − Uab(1Ω))} is an LMP
representation of %∗.
The proof of Theorem 3.4.3 is found in the appendix. It depends on the following
fundamental structure theorem for preordered vector spaces V.
Suppose first that %comV is a complete preorder on V. Say that a lexicographic
filtration of (V,%comV ) is a pair (O,G) consisting of a set O of subspaces of V that
are completely ordered by inclusion, and a family G = {gW }W∈O of linear maps
gW : W → R, satisfying the following conditions:
(a) For each v ∈ V there is a smallest Wv ∈ O containing v, and every W ∈ O
equals Wv for some v.
(b) For each v ∈W ∈ O, gW (v) = 0 ⇐⇒ Wv (W or W = W0.
(c) For v, w ∈ V with v, w %comV 0,
v %comV w ⇐⇒ Wv ⊇Ww and gWv (v) ≥ gWv (w).
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When %V is not complete, we consider complete extensions of it; here a preorder
(Y,%2) extends a preorder (Y,%1) if for all x, y ∈ Y , x ∼1 y =⇒ x ∼2 y, and
x 1 y =⇒ x 2 y.
Theorem 3.4.5. (1) If (V,%V) is a preordered vector space, then v %V w if and
only if v %comV w for all complete vector preorders %comV extending %V.
(2) If (V,%comV ) is a completely preordered vector space, then it admits a lexi-
cographic filtration (O,G). Moreover, the set O is uniquely determined, and each
function gW ∈ G is uniquely determined up to positive scale.
(3) If %V satisfies (MC), then in (1) we can consider only complete extensions
%comV that satisfy (MC). If %comV satisfies (MC), then in (2) we have O = {V, {v :
v ∼comV 0}}, and thus a single function gV such that v %comV w ⇐⇒ gV(v) ≥ gV(w).
Several similar theorems are known in the literature, going back to Hahn for
ordered abelian groups; see Conrad [37] for references and results in even greater
generality. The best-known result for ordered vector spaces in particular is due to
Hausner and Wendel [69].26They show that every completely ordered vector space
can be embeded in a lexicographically ordered function space, but their construction
depends on transfinite induction and is extremely non-unique. In contrast, the
lexicographic filtration that we emphasise is essentially unique and constructively
definable, while amply illustrating the lexicographic nature of vector preorders.
3.5. Utilitarian preorders. We propose to define as utilitarian preorders those
social preorders which are generated by some individual preorder which satisfies
(I3). There are two main reasons for this. First, Proposition 3.4.2 shows that these
are precisely the social preorders which admit a Harsanyi-like mixture-preserving
total utility representation of a very general form. Second, the premises of Theo-
rem 2.3.1 seem to be mandatory for a utilitarian to accept, and when we further
add (I3) to the individual preorder, we immediately obtain further conditions which
have a natural utilitarian flavor, namely (P3) and (S3). In fact, as already noted,
those conditions could be used in place of (I3). We further develop this argument
in section 5.1, where we show that any social preorder which satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 2.3.1 has features that are arguably essential to utilitarianism, namely
indifference to both ex ante and ex post equality.
4. Non-expected utility
In the constant population case, our aggregation theorems are compatible with
any non-expected utility theory at the individual level, provided the theory can
be understood in terms of a preorder on probability measures. In the variable
case, the individual preorder must satisfy Omega Independence, but we saw in
Proposition 2.4.1 that this imposes very little restriction.
There are two reasons to further explore non-expected utility theory. The first is
normative. Although independence remains very popular at the normative level, it
continues to have its critics; see, for example, Buchak [28]. Parallel to the expected
utility case, it is therefore natural to ask what non-expected utility conditions on
the individual preorder imply about the social preorder.
The second is positive. Even if one sides with independence at the normative
level, it is hard to ignore its widespread violation at the empirical level. Of course,
some subjects may violate independence because they accept, for example, social
judgments concerning fairness between individuals. The most famous of these is
Diamond’s example, to be discussed in section 5.1. But the empirical literature
26For a survey of more recent developments in lexicographic approaches to expected utility,
see Pivato [90, §7.1]
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has mostly focused on subjects who violate independence when only self-interest
is at play, as in Allais’s example. Such subjects may on occasion put themselves
in the position of the social observer to make judgments about social distribution.
But they are unlikely to suspend their views about risk in the process, and it is
natural to ask whether their views about risk are reflected in their views about
distribution, even in risk-free cases. Answering this first requires having models of
what independence-violating judgments about risk imply about social distribution.
In what follows, we discuss separately and then in combination two standard ap-
proaches to non-expected utility, what we call axiomatic and functional approaches.
This will lead to a further class of total utility representations, adding to the case
for a utilitarian interpretation of our aggregation theorems.
4.1. Axioms. One strand of non-expected utility theory has been to articulate
axioms which weaken independence in natural ways. Some non-expected utility
axioms are straightforwardly inherited by the social preorder in both the constant
and variable population cases. These include Betweenness, Quasiconcavity, Qua-
siconvexity, Very Weak Substitution, and Mixture Symmetry. In addition, Weak
Substitution and Ratio Substitution are inherited in at least the constant popula-
tion case.27 These results follow easily from linearity of the map L 7→ pL.
These conditions are typically combined with (O) and (C) in the non-expected
utility literature, but there is work aimed at allowing for failures of each of those
conditions. Just to give one example, Karni and Zhou [71] propose an axiom they
call Weak Substitution for Noncomparable Lotteries, a condition which relaxes
Weak Substitution to accommodate incompleteness.28 At least in the constant
population case, this is also inherited by the social preorder.
Inheritance of other non-expected utility axioms is less straightforward, as they
are designed for the case where the set of outcomes is an interval I of real numbers.
But if W = I, for example, then typically H = In, and such axioms would not then
apply to the social preorder.
Those axioms aside, the ease with which inheritance can be shown for the ax-
ioms so far discussed might lead one to guess that inheritance is quite ubiquitous.
Nevertheless, some non-expected utility axioms are not inherited.
Say that a preorder%X on P(Y ) is upper-measurable if Ux := {y ∈ X : 1y %X 1x}
is measurable for every x ∈ X. Suppose % is upper-measurable. Define a preorder
%SDX on P(Y ) by p %SDX q ⇐⇒ p(Uy) ≥ q(Uy) for all y ∈ Y . We say that p
stochastically dominates q when p %SDX q. Consider the following axiom, which
requires consistency with stochastic dominance.
Monotonicity (M) For an upper-measurable preorder %X , (i) p ∼SDX q =⇒
p ∼Y q; and (ii) p SDX q =⇒ p X q.
This axiom is very widely assumed in non-expected utility theory. As a constraint
on the individual preorder, it provides non-expected utility theorists with an answer
to an earlier worry.
To explain, whereas Pareto relates superiority for each individual to social superi-
ority, the following condition on the social preorder weakens it by relating stochastic
dominance for each individual to social superiority.
SD-Pareto Suppose %∗ is upper-measurable. Then
(i) Pi(L) ∼SDP∗ Pi(L′) for all i ∈ I∗ =⇒ L ∼∗ L′; and
27See Chew, Epstein, and Segal [33] for definitions of Quasiconcavity, Quasiconvexity, and
Mixture Symmetry, and Chew [32] for the other axioms. Schmidt [97] provides a survey.
28For discussion of failures of continuity, see Schmidt [96].
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(ii) Pi(L) %SDP∗ Pi(L′) for all i ∈ I∗ and Pj(L) SDP∗ Pj(L′) for some j ∈ I∗
=⇒ L ∗ L′.
We noted in §3.2 that when the individual preorder violates an independence
axiom, the dual Pareto axiom is violated. But when the individual preorder satisfies
(M), there is a limit to the severity of Pareto violations.
Proposition 4.1.1. Suppose %∗ is generated by Omega Independent and upper-
measurable %P∗ . Then %P∗ satisfies (M) =⇒ %∗ satisfies SD-Pareto.
In response to criticism of their forced rejection of Pareto axioms, non-expected
utility theorists may therefore reply that they accept (M), and thus endorse SD-
Pareto, and claim that the transition from SD-Pareto to full-blown Pareto involves
stronger assumptions about risk than have been acknowledged.
However, the status of (M) in non-expected utility theory leads to some problems.
When %X satisfies EUT, it also satisfies (M). Thus when the individual preorder
satisfies EUT, it automatically satisfies (M), and by Proposition 3.3.1, so does the
social preorder. However, the following example shows that the social preorder does
not in general inherit (M), even in the constant population case.
Example 4.1.2. Make the assumptions of Example 1.5.4, again with the concrete
assumption that r(x) = x2, and equip W and H with the Borel sigma algebras.
Assume a population of two people. Then % ranks a history h with welfare levels
w1 ≤ w2 according to the aggregate score V (h) = 34w1 + 14w2. Both %P and %
are upper measurable, and %P satisfies (M). Let h1 = [0, 0], h2 = [−1, 3] and
h2 = [−2, 6]. Then h1 ∼ h2 ∼ h3, so that h1 ∼SD L := 12h2 + 12h3. But U(ph1) = 0
and U(pL) = − 14 , hence h1  L, violating (M)(i). For a violation of (M)(ii), let
h4 = [− 18 ,− 18 ]. Then L SD h4 but h4  L.
This example reveals tension in a common line of thought. For in some vari-
ant, (M) has been seen as ‘[t]he most widely acknowledged principle of rational
behavior under risk’ (Schmidt [97, p. 19]). But it has also often been said that
rationality requires applying at the social level whatever conditions one imposes at
the individual level (e.g. Harsanyi [64, p. 637]).
One response would be insist that (M) does apply at the social level, and say so
much the worse for non-expected utility theories which are forced to reject it at that
level. But the following result suggests that this view would lead to a significant
restriction on non-expected utility theories, which universally reject (I3).
Proposition 4.1.3. Make the assumptions of Theorem 2.3.1. Suppose that H∗ con-
sists of every logically possible history whose population is finite; P∗ and L∗ consist
of all finitely supported prospects and lotteries respectively; and %P∗ is complete and
continuous.29 Then %∗ satisfies (M) =⇒ %P∗ satisfies (I3).
Thus it appears that the relationship between individual and social rationality
is more complex, and that endorsing a non-expected utility theory which takes (M)
as a premise at the individual level while rejecting (M) at the social level remains
a live option. But this leads to a technical difficulty, as the representation theorem
for that theory will not be directly applicable to the social preorder. We therefore
now examine other ways of obtaining non-expected utility representations of the
social preorder.
29 Say that a sequence (Pn) in P∗ converges strongly to P ∈ P∗ (written Pn s−→ P ) whenever
Pn(U)→ P (U) for all measurable U in W∗. The continuity condition we adopt is that whenever
Pn
s−→ P , (i) Pn %P∗ Q for all n =⇒ P %P∗ Q; and (ii) Q %P∗ Pn for all n =⇒ Q %P∗ P .
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4.2. The functional approach. The axiomatic approach to non-expected utility
theory tries to respect the normative plausibility of independence by focusing on
axioms which only mildly weaken it. By contrast, what we will call the functional
approach, pioneered by Machina [74], abandons independence entirely while impos-
ing technical conditions on preorders which are just strong enough to allow one to
apply expected utility techniques. Machina imposed representability by a Fre´chet
differentiable function, but this turned out to exclude a number of popular non-
expected utility models. However, Chew et al. [34] and Chew and Nishimura [36]
showed that Machina’s main results could be obtained under the weaker assumption
of representability by a Gaˆteaux differentiable function. Other differentiability con-
cepts have since been discussed, but Gaˆteaux remains the most popular and has
yielded many important applications; see, for example, Cerreia-Vioglio et al [30]
for entry into the literature. For brevity, however, we only consider Gaˆteaux dif-
ferentiability. We first define this and relate it to expected utility. We then give
results concerning the inheritance of Gaˆteaux differentiability, and elaborate on the
significance of these results for our aggregation theorems. Roughly speaking, we
generalise Proposition 3.3.1(ii, iv), showing how ‘local’ expected utility theory for
the individual preorder determines a ‘locally’ utilitarian social preorder.
Let P be a convex subset of a vector space. We say that V : P → R is Gaˆteaux
differentiable at p ∈ P if the limit
V ′p(q − p) := lim
t→0+
V (p+ t(q − p))− V (p)
t
exists for all q ∈ P .30 Thus V ′p(q − p) is a directional derivative of V at p in the
direction q−p. We use obvious terminology, saying, for example, that V is Gaˆteaux
differentiable when it is Gaˆteaux differentiable at all p ∈ P .
Suppose further that P is a convex set of finite signed measures on a measurable
space Y . We say that V is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at p ∈ P when it is
Gaˆteaux differentiable at p and there exists a P -integrable vp : Y → R such that
V ′p(q − p) =
∫
Y
vp d(q − p) for all q ∈ P .31 Let ∇Vp be the set of such vp; thus
∇Vp 6= ∅ if and only if V is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at p.
While Gaˆteaux differentiability has a simple interpretation, the integral version
can be made intuitive by connecting it with expected utility theory, as we now
explain. Suppose henceforth that P is a convex set of probability measures. A
function V : P → R is an expected utility function if there is a P -integrable function
v such that, for any q ∈ P , V (q) = ∫
Y
v dq. Note that for any basepoint p ∈ P , we
can rewrite this as V (p+ t(q− p)) = ∫
Y
v d(p+ t(q− p)) for all q ∈ P and t ∈ [0, 1].
Following Machina [74], it is natural to say that V is a local expected utility (LEU)
function at p if there is a measurable vp satisfying this equation up to first order in
t. To be precise, for each q ∈ P , vp satisfies
(3) V (p+ t(q − p)) =
∫
Y
vp d(p+ t(q − p)) + o(t) for t ∈ [0, 1].
We say that V is an LEU function when there is such a vp for every p ∈ P .
Suppose an ordering %P on P has an LEU representation, i.e. is represented by
an LEU function V . When
∫
Y
vp dq >
∫
Y
vp dp, (3) implies that for all sufficiently
small t > 0, p + t(q − p) P p. Thus small linear perturbations of a point p ∈ P
are governed by classical expected utility theory with respect to the local utility
30Our notion of Gaˆteaux differentiability is very weak, as it only requires a one-sided limit,
only considers q ∈ P , and does not make any topological assumptions.
31Similar definitions, but with more restrictions on vp or Y , are found in Chew et al. [34],
Chew and Mao [35], and Cerreia-Vioglio et al [30]. For example, the latter, from whom we borrow
notation, assume vp is continuous and bounded, but we make no such assumption.
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function vp. Machina’s insight was that important global properties of orderings
could be inferred from such local expected utility behavior. However, the following
is immediate from definitions.
Lemma 4.2.1. Suppose P is a convex set of probability measures. Then V : P → R
is an LEU function if and only if it is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable.
Proposition 4.2.2 (Gaˆteaux: constant population inheritance). Suppose %P gen-
erates %. Suppose %P can be represented by a function U : P → R. Fix L ∈ L.
Then
(i) % can be represented by V : L→ R defined by V (L) := #IU(pL).
(ii) If U is Gaˆteaux differentiable at pL, then so is V is at L.
(iii) If U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at pL, then so is V at L; moreover,
for any uL ∈ ∇UpL , we have
∑
i∈I uL ◦Wi ∈ ∇VL.
This result has two significant implications. Let us say a preorder is Gaˆteaux rep-
resentable if it is representable by a (integrally or otherwise) Gaˆteaux differentiable
function. First, then, the social preorders generated by the Gaˆteaux representable
individual preorders inherit Gaˆteaux representability. Thus the wide range of tools
and results associated with the Gaˆteaux concepts can be accessed at the social level
merely by imposing Gaˆteaux representability at the individual level.
Second, specialising now to integral Gaˆteaux representations, the resulting social
preorders have a natural interpretation. In classical (Harsanyi-style) utilitarianism,
the constant population social welfare function V is given by expected total utility.
Adapting our discussion of local expected utility, it is natural to say that V is locally
utilitarian at a lottery L ∈ L if this is true to first order for linear perturbations of
L, i.e. (more precisely) if there exists a utility function uL : W→ R such that, for
each fixed M ∈ L,
(4) V (L+ t(M − L)) =
∫
H
(∑
i∈I
uL ◦Wi
)
d(L+ t(M − L)) + o(t) for t ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 4.2.2(iii) shows that, under the conditions of our constant population
aggregation theorem, if the individual preorder is integrally Gaˆteaux representable,
then the social preorder has a locally utilitarian representation. This is a ‘local’
version of Proposition 3.3.1(ii) and bolsters the utilitarian interpretation of the
aggregation theorem. In fact, the locally utilitarian representations constructed in
Proposition 4.2.2(iii) are ‘more utilitarian’ than suggested merely by (4), because
the local utility function uL is characterised in terms of the individual preorder, as
it is in ordinary utilitarianism.32
Let us extend this result to the variable population setting. We will show that if
the individual preorder has an integral Gaˆteaux representation U∗, satisfying one
extra condition, then the social preorder has a local utilitarian representation, now
including a critical level; this is a local version of Proposition 3.3.1(iv).
For any L ∈ L∗I , write
(5) V ∗(L) := #IU∗(pIL)−#IU∗(1Ω).
It is easy to check that this is a well-defined function of L ∈ L∗, independent of I,
if U∗ is ‘Omega-linear’ in the sense that, for all P ∈ P∗ and α ∈ [0, 1],
(6) U∗(αP + (1− α)1Ω) = αU∗(P ) + (1− α)U∗(1Ω).
32A slightly different notion of local utilitarianism was discussed by Machina [74, §5.2]. His
notion applies to social welfare functions on histories, or rather on ‘wealth distributions’, which
he idealises as probability measures on W.
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Note that Omega-linearity is a natural correlate of Omega Independence, which it
immediately implies. Of course, there may be ways to define an appropriate V ∗
when U∗ is not Omega-linear, but this particular version gains interest from the
following two propositions.
Proposition 4.2.3 (Gaˆteaux: variable population inheritance). Suppose %P∗ gen-
erates %∗. Assume that the sigma algebra on H∗ is coherent.33 Suppose %P∗ can be
represented by an Omega-linear function U∗ : P∗ → R. Fix L ∈ L∗I . Then
(i) %∗ can be represented by V ∗ : L∗ → R as defined by (5);
(ii) If U∗ is Gaˆteaux differentiable at pIL, then so is V
∗ at L;
(iii) If U∗ is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at pIL, then so is V
∗ at L; moreover,
for any uL ∈ ∇U∗pIL , we have
∑
i∈I∗(uL ◦W∗i − uL(Ω)) ∈ ∇V ∗L .
The constant and variable population cases are related in the following result.
Proposition 4.2.4 (Gaˆteaux: extension). Let P∗ include P.34 Suppose %P is
representable by a Gaˆteaux differentiable function U : P→ R. Fix any critical level
c ∈ R. Then U can be extended to an Omega-linear Gaˆteaux differentiable function
U∗ : P∗ → R with U∗(1Ω) = c, and the preorder %P∗ represented by U∗ is Omega-
independent and includes %P. If U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable, then we can
choose U∗ to be integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable on P∗ \{1Ω}.
One could extend these results to the Vector LEU case defined in parallel to
Vector EUT, but we will not pursue this.
In summary, let us recapitulate for the integral case. If the individual preorder
is integrally Gaˆteaux representable in the constant population case, then it can
be embedded in many Omega Independent individual preorders in the variable
population case, with free choice of the critical level, which are also integrally
Gaˆteaux representable (except perhaps at 1Ω), and the constant and variable social
preorders these generate are locally utilitarian.
4.3. In combination. To pursue both the normative and positive projects out-
lined in the introduction to this section, one wishes to impose natural conditions
on the individual preorder, then derive conclusions about the social preorder. But
the axiomatic and functional approaches face complementary difficulties. The ax-
iomatic approach articulates natural conditions on the individual preorder, but it
may not be easy to work out what they imply about the social preorder. The con-
ditions may not be inherited by the social preorder, and even if they are, the social
domain conditions may be too complicated for the relevant representation theo-
rems to be directly applicable. Conversely, it is far from obvious what normative or
behavioral significance technical conditions such as Gaˆteaux representability have,
so even when they are inherited by the social preorder, it may be unclear why this
matters. In combination, however, each approach may remedy the other’s defects.
Much of the interest in Gaˆteaux representability arises because preorders which
satisfy natural non-expected utility axioms turn out to be Gaˆteaux representable.
Thus by using the results of the previous section, we obtain Gaˆteaux representa-
tions of the social preorder merely by imposing natural conditions on the individual
preorder.
33We defined ‘coherent’ just before Proposition 2.3.3. This assumption is only necessary for
the results concerning integral Gaˆteaux differentiability.
34This was defined in section 2.4.
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Having defined utilitarian preorders as those social preorders generated by indi-
vidual preorders which satisfy (I3), it is natural to say that social preorders gen-
erated by any individual preorder are generalized utilitarian.35 This proposal is
supported by the fact that even without (I3), many natural conditions on the indi-
vidual preorder are at least compatible with, and sometimes guarantee,36 integral
Gaˆteaux representations of the individual preorder, and in both the constant and
variable population settings, those generate locally utilitarian social preorders. In
addition, Proposition 3.4.2 makes it natural to label non-expected utilitarian those
generalized utilitarian preorders generated by individual preorders which violate
(I3).
5. Comparisons
We now relate our aggregation theorems to several standard topics: egalitarian-
ism; the ex ante versus ex post distinction; and interpersonal comparisons. We end
with a comparison to Harsanyi’s approach to social aggregation.
5.1. Generalized utilitarianism and egalitarianism. We know of no discussion
of generalized utilitarian preorders. Our goal in this section is to contrast them with
egalitarian social preorders. But first we show that they form a rich class.
To simplify the discussion, let us assume that H∗ is the set of all possible histories
with finite populations, and that H ⊂ H∗ is a set of all possible histories with some
constant population. Let P∗ and P be the sets of prospects with finite support on
W∗ and W respectively. Let L∗ and L be the sets of lotteries with finite support
on H∗ and H respectively. In particular, for each h ∈ H∗ there is a lottery 1h ∈ L∗.
Say that a preorder %∗0 on H∗ is consistent with generalized utilitarianism if there
exists some generalized utilitarian preorder %∗ on L∗ such that for all h, h′ ∈ H∗,
h %∗0 h′ ⇐⇒ 1h %∗ 1h′ . We can similarly ask whether a preorder %0 on H is
consistent with generalized utilitarianism for the given finite population: whether
h %0 h′ ⇐⇒ 1h % 1h′ for all h, h′ ∈ H. Discussions of the ethics of distribution
often focus solely on risk-free cases. So, in the first instance, it is natural to ask
which preorders on histories are consistent with generalized utilitarianism.
We answer this question in terms of the following two conditions.
Weak Anonymity Given h ∈ H and σ ∈ Σ, we have h ∼0 σh.
Next, say that k ∈ H∗ is an m-scaling of h ∈ H∗ if it consists of ‘m copies’ of h –
that is, there is an m-to-1 map s of I∗ onto itself such that Wi(k) = Ws(i)(h) for
every individual i. For example, [x, x, y, y,Ω,Ω, . . . ] is a 2-scaling of [x, y,Ω, . . . ].
Scale Invariance If, for some m > 0, k, k′ ∈ H∗ are m-scalings of h, h′ ∈ H∗
respectively, then k %∗0 k′ ⇐⇒ h %∗0 h′.
Weak Anonymity is obviously a very weak and uncontroversial constraint, while
Scale Invariance is not that much stronger. But these are the only constraints
imposed by consistency with generalized utilitarianism.
Proposition 5.1.1. (i) A preorder on H is consistent with constant population
generalized utilitarianism if and only if it satisfies Weak Anonymity.
(ii) A preorder on H∗ is consistent with generalized utilitarianism if and only if it
satisfies Scale Invariance.
35 The term ‘generalized utilitarianism’ has been used differently in the literature; in the case
of risk it has been used to refer to social preorders which are represented the sum of transformed
individual expected utilities. See e.g. Grant et al [56]. We give reasons for preferring our usage
in the next section.
36See Chew and Mao [35] for a summary for the case where W is a real interval and P is the
set of Borel probability measures.
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This result shows that all the seemingly reasonable egalitarian (and other) pre-
orders of histories are included in the generalized utilitarian preorders of histories.
This raises questions about the significance of generalized utilitarian preorders as
a class. In particular, why do they merit the ‘utilitarian’ name, if they include
preorders with apparently egalitarian properties?
In fact, despite this worry, the axioms of the aggregation theorems precisely
rule out certain features of the social preorder that may be considered essential to
standard egalitarian concerns. Thus, even if some generalized utilitarian preorders
are egalitarian in some useful sense, this class still excludes the main lines of egal-
itarianism. To see this, suppose given welfare levels x and z with x P z, and a
population I = {a, b}. Consider the following lotteries, with columns corresponding
to histories.
LE
1
2
1
2
a x z
b x z
LF
1
2
1
2
a x z
b z x
LU
1
2
1
2
a x x
b z z
It is arguable that LE is socially better than LF on the grounds that while the two
individuals face identical prospects, LE ensures ex post equality (Myerson [85]).
It is also arguable that LF is better than LU on the grounds that while there is
nothing to chose between their outcomes, under LF there is ex ante equality, so LF
is arguably fairer (Diamond [42]).
In our view, suitable generalizations of ‘LE  LF ’ and ‘LF  LU ’ are essential to
ex post and ex ante egalitarianism respectively.37 If so, there is a principled distinc-
tion between generalized utilitarianism and each of ex post and ex ante egalitarian-
ism, even if they take generalized forms.38 In particular, generalized utilitarianism
is inconsistent with ex post egalitarianism because it accepts Anteriority, and incon-
sistent with ex ante egalitarianism because it accepts Two-Stage Anonymity. Thus
despite the egalitarian appearance of some generalized utilitarian preorders of his-
tories, there is a sharp distinction between generalized utilitarianism and standard
forms of egalitarianism, adding to the case for our definition of the former.39
Steps towards further understanding egalitarianism and generalized utilitarian-
ism could be taken as follows. Any condition on the social preorder of histories is
equivalent to some condition on the individual preorder, and vice versa. It would
be worthwhile to make such equivalences explicit for standard egalitarian-seeming
conditions at the social level, and also for standard conditions from non-expected
utility theory at the individual level. It could turn out that standard conditions at
the two levels are nicely paired; alternatively, standard conditions at one level may
turn out to generate novel conditions at the other level. Such results would have
both normative and positive applications.
Example 5.1.2. We saw that RDSs are naturally paired with RDIs in Example 1.5.4.
At the normative level, downward increasing RDSs have been seen as plausible
forms of egalitarianism. This might be taken as normative support for the risk-
avoidant RDIs which generate them. On the other hand, the empirically supported
RDIs have S-shaped risk functions.40 Provided the population is large enough, such
RDIs lead to RDSs which are apparently inegalitarian at the high end, favoring
37For similar views, see Broome [23, 24], Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler [10], Fleur-
baey [53], Saito [95] and McCarthy [75] among others.
38McCarthy and Thomas [77] is an attempt to model generalized ex ante and generalized ex
post egalitarianism.
39The alternative usage of ‘generalized utilitarianism’ mentioned in note 35 typically violates
Two Stage Anonymity. In the popular case where the transform is a strictly increasing, strictly
concave function, the corresponding social preorder ranks LF  LU , and it seems to us much
more natural to see this as a form of ex ante egalitarianism, not a version of utilitarianism.
40See Schmidt [97, §4.2.2] for references.
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unit transfers from the relatively well-off (but perhaps absolutely badly off) to the
relatively better off. Given the lack of enthusiasm for inegalitarian ideas, this might
call into question actual attitudes to risk.
5.2. Ex ante and ex post . We now explain why there is a natural sense in which
generalized utilitarian preorders are those social preorders which are weakly ex ante
and anonymously ex post. We focus on the constant population case, the variable
case being parallel. The Pareto conditions are therefore understood to be relative
to a fixed population.
5.2.1. Ex ante. Let (RP) and (Ant) stand for Reduction to Prospects and Anteri-
ority. The following irreversible implications are obtained by noting that (RP) is
equivalent to the restriction of (P3) to lotteries in L(P).
(RP)⇐ (P3)⇒ (P2)⇒ (P1)⇒ (Ant)
Social preorders are said to be ex ante if they respect unanimous ‘before the event’
judgments of individual welfare. Each of the above principles expresses some such
notion of respect, which helps explain why ‘ex ante’ is used quite flexibly. But
the most popular interpretation sees social preorders as ex ante if they satisfy (P2)
(Mongin and d’Aspremont [83, §5.4]). This corresponds to a relatively strong notion
of unanimity: respect the unanimous judgments of non-indifferent individuals. But
this notion of unanimity is more fully captured by the stronger (P3). We therefore
suggest that it is social preorders which satisfy (P3) which should be seen as ex
ante.
Requiring a social preorder to be ex ante in this sense carries an implicit com-
mitment: given modest assumptions, it means that the individual preorder has
to satisfy Strong Independence (see Proposition 3.2.1). But that rules out a wide
range of possibilities for individual welfare comparisons, so it is natural to ask which
principle is as ex ante as possible while remaining neutral on whether the individual
preorder satisfies any independence axiom. Given Proposition 3.2.1 again, and the
principles displayed above, that principle is the conjunction of (RP) and (Ant). We
will therefore say that social preorders satisfying that conjunct are weakly ex ante.
Similarly, in the variable population case, we will say that a social preorder
satisfying (P3) is ex ante, and one satisfying Anteriority and Reduction to Prospects
(Variable) is weakly ex ante.
5.2.2. Ex post. Social preorders are often said to be ex post when they satisfy ex-
pected utility (Mongin and d’Aspremont [83, §5.4]). But this seems distant from
the ordinary meaning of the term, which suggests that lotteries should be socially
evaluated from some sort of ‘after the event’ perspective in which all risk has re-
solved. In particular, if two lotteries are in some natural sense equivalent from that
perspective, then they should be ranked as equals.
To approach the matter more directly, let us temporarily suppose that for all
h in H, {h} is measurable and 1h is in L. Say that a ‘level of social welfare’ is
an equivalence class of histories under the social indifference relation ∼0. Two
lotteries are naturally said to be equivalent from an ‘after the event’ perspective
whenever they define the same probability distribution over levels of social welfare.
Formally, say that a subset U of H is ‘closed under indifference’ if h ∈ U and h ∼0 h′
entail h′ ∈ U . Then we will say that a social preorder is ex post if it satisfies the
following.41
41Note that, when the social preorder is upper-measurable, so that the stochastic dominance
relation is defined, Posteriority is implied by the first part of Monotonicity (M)(i), and these
conditions often coincide in practice. Even then, though, Posteriority is logically weaker, and gets
more directly at the ex post idea.
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Posteriority. Given L,L′ ∈ L, suppose that L(U) = L′(U) whenever U is
a measurable subset of H that is closed under indifference. Then L ∼ L′.
Continuing with the temporary domain assumptions, if U is a measurable subset
of H that is closed under indifference, Anonymity implies that U is permutation-
invariant. Hence given Anonymity, Posterior Anonymity emerges as a much weaker,
special case of Posteriority. It is therefore natural to call social preorders satisfy-
ing Posterior Anonymity anonymously ex post. The same applies in the variable
population case.
An appealing feature of this terminology is that anonymously ex post social
preorders rule out ex ante egalitarianism, and weakly ex ante social preorders rule
out ex post egalitarianism.
It should be noted that this derivation of Posterior Anonymity does not always
make sense in our very general framework. For example, the definition of Posteri-
ority presupposes that 1h is in L for all h in H. Nevertheless, Posterior Anonymity
has self-standing appeal, and is always well-defined in our framework.
5.2.3. The aggregation theorems redux. Two-Stage Anonymity is entailed by Pos-
terior Anonymity, and although Posterior Anonymity is our conceptually favored
principle, it was simpler to work with Two-Stage Anonymity. Nevertheless, granted
some modest measurability assumptions in the variable population case, Proposi-
tions 1.3.2 and 2.3.3 show that this makes no difference. Thus we can recapitulate
our aggregation theorems as follows: given an individual preorder (satisfying Omega
Independence in the variable case), the social preorder it generates is the unique
social preorder which is weakly ex ante and anonymously ex post.
5.3. Interpersonal comparisons and incompleteness. We develop our discus-
sion of interpersonal comparisons by starting with what we will call Harsanyi’s
original theorem. This theorem shows that if intrapersonal comparisons for each
individual satisfy EUT, the social preorder satisfies EUT, and strong Pareto holds,
then the social preorder is represented by the sum of strictly positively weighted
individual expected utilities.
Harsanyi’s result, however, is not much use without supplementation. Since the
utility weights are undetermined beyond being strictly positive, unless two lotteries
are already ranked by strong Pareto, Harsanyi’s conclusion does not determine their
social ranking. Of course, as Harsanyi [63] immediately notes, this problem can be
solved by tacking on interpersonal comparisons and anonymity to the end of his
conclusion, thereby arriving at the conclusion of Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem.
But there is a more serious problem connected with interpersonal comparisons.
Harsanyi’s original theorem assumes that the social preorder is complete. But
without making any assumptions about interpersonal comparisons, it is difficult to
see what justifies the assumption that the social preorder is complete.42 Adding on
interpersonal comparisons at the end obviously does nothing to help as completeness
has already been assumed to get to that point.
This points to a peculiarity in Harsanyi’s method. If one is happy to add on
interpersonal comparisons at the end, it is hard to see the cost of including them
at the beginning. This suggests that Harsanyi may have been underexploiting in-
terpersonal comparisons. While interpersonal comparisons can be used to fix the
42For example, if social completeness is dropped from Harsanyi’s premises, the social preorder
could be the highly incomplete social preorder induced by strong Pareto (Danan et al [40]). Unease
on this topic this is reflected in the large debate on whether Harsanyi was implicitly assuming
interpersonal comparisons. See e.g. Harsanyi [67, p. 294], [66, p. 227], [65, pp. 81–2]; Broome [24,
p. 219]; Mongin [80, pp. 348–50]; and Mongin and d’Aspremont [83, p. 432].
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weights given social completeness, using them from the outset opens up the pos-
sibility of using them to justify social completeness. More generally, if one follows
Harsanyi by encoding both inter and intrapersonal comparisons within a single
preorder, and uses this preorder at the start, one has the possibility of explicitly
showing how completeness of the social preorder depends on completeness of the
individual preorder; or more generally, showing precisely how gaps in the individual
preorder determine gaps in the social preorder.
The main result of Pivato [89] makes progress in this direction. Consider the
following independence and Pareto axioms, which are respectively intermediate in
strength between (I1) and (I2), and (P1) and (P2).
(I1.5) For all α ∈ (0, 1), p %X p′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q %X αp′ + (1− α)q.
(P1.5) (i) Pi(L) %P Pi(L′) for all i ∈ I =⇒ L % L′; and (ii) Pi(L) P Pi(L′)
for all i ∈ I =⇒ L  L′.
Assuming that the individual and social preorders satisfy (I1.5), (P1.5) and
Anonymity, Pivato shows that the social preorder must extend the one generated
by the individual preorder. This gives an upper limit on how incomplete the social
preorder can be, but forces the individual preorder to satisfy (I1.5), precluding most
non-expected utility theories. In contrast, the conclusion of Theorem 1.3.1 uniquely
determines the social preorder without imposing any restrictions on the individual
preorder. In particular, it shows precisely which gaps in the social preorder are
generated by gaps in the individual preorder.
This raises the question of how our conclusion can be stronger than Pivato’s,
for in most ways our premises are much weaker: Anteriority is strictly weaker than
(P1.5) (or even P1); and Two-Stage Anonymity is strictly weaker than Anonymity
conjoined with (I1.5) (or even I1). The answer has to do with Reduction to Prospects.
Part of the answer is that we use a stronger domain condition, namely L(P) ⊂
L, in order to apply Reduction to Prospects; defense was given in Remark 1.1.2.
But the main answer is that Reduction to Prospects is not implied by Pivato’s
assumptions, or any standard Pareto condition. However, Reduction to Prospects
is equivalent to the restriction of (P1.5) to lotteries in L(P) conjoined with the
following principle: for any P , P ′ in P, P uprisePP ′ =⇒ L(P )upriseL(P ′). But we suggest
that this principle is very plausible.
We can now give another perspective on Theorem 1.3.1. On its own, Reduction to
Prospects provides the desired dependence of the social preorder on the individual
preorder in the special case of comparisons between lotteries guaranteeing perfect
equality. In that situation, it tells us precisely which gaps in the social preorder are
generated by gaps in the individual preorder. When combined with Anteriority and
Two-Stage Anonymity, these conclusions extend to the general case of comparisons
between arbitrary lotteries.
5.4. Harsanyi. Theorem 1.3.1 is an improvement on Harsanyi’s anonymous the-
orem. In common with Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem, it shows how the social
preorder is uniquely determined by the individual preorder. But Theorem 1.3.1
achieves this with no constraints on the individual preorder whatsoever, thus per-
mitting a very wide range of specializations. One specialization results in a very
general Harsanyi-like representation of the social preorder merely by supposing that
the individual preorder satisfies (I3) (Proposition 3.4.2). Another specialization re-
sults in the conclusion of Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem merely by assuming that
the individual preorder satisfies EUT (Proposition 3.3.1). That specialization uses
much weaker assumptions than Harsanyi’s version: it derives, rather than assumes,
both Strong Pareto and, at the social level, all of the expected utility axioms. Total
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utility representations which are locally Harsanyi-like can be obtained even when
the individual preorder violates (I3) (Proposition 4.2.2(iii)).
However, despite resting on much weaker premises, Theorem 1.3.1 shares fun-
damental distributive assumptions with Harsanyi’s theorem. In particular, both
results accept premises which express indifference to the two ways of valuing equal-
ity discussed in §5.1, namely those expressed by ex ante and ex post egalitarianism.
More generally, Theorem 1.3.1 weakens but preserves the ex ante and ex post fla-
vor of Harsanyi’s result. It uses Harsanyi’s device of encoding interpersonal and
intrapersonal comparisons within a single preorder, but makes much weaker as-
sumptions about it. For these reasons, we suggest that Theorem 1.3.1 should be
seen as articulating the core of Harsanyi’s anonymous theorem.
In one way, this acts as a corrective to some of Harsanyi’s remarks. Harsanyi [64,
p. 627] describes the extensive use of expected utility as a “very crucial ingredient”
for his theory, and it is easy to get the impression that Harsanyi’s anonymous
theorem is in some sense all about expected utility theory. But we are suggesting
that the core of Harsanyi’s approach turns out to have nothing to do with expected
utility theory.
In more important ways, it amplifies Harsanyi’s insights. First, by dropping all of
the expected utility axioms, it shows that the core of his approach can accommodate
a much wider range of views about welfare comparisons than permitted by his
anonymous theorem. In particular, in dropping completeness, Theorem 1.3.1 allows
for any amount of incomparability between welfare levels; in dropping continuity, it
allows some welfare levels to be infinitely more valuable than others; and in dropping
independence, it allows for all sorts of views about risk in ranking prospects over
welfare levels.
Second, our constant population Theorem 1.3.1 generalizes very easily to our
variable population Theorem 2.3.1, requiring no significantly new ethical idea or
further element of justification. This contrasts with other approaches to the exten-
sion. In particular, along with the full expected utility framework, Hammond [58]
and Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [15, 16, 18] introduce novel ethical ideas to
effect that extension. Hammond uses a strong separability principle which says that
the welfare levels of the long-dead can be ignored. Blackorby et al assume that at
least some histories have a critical level. Under one of several important interpreta-
tions, Pivato [90, Thm. 1] shows, roughly, that for variable but finite populations,
there is a Harsanyi-like total utility representation into a linearly ordered abelian
group if and only if the social preorder is complete, anonymous, and satisfies a
separability condition. Under this interpretation, the separability condition implies
both strong independence and strong separability across individuals. Thus the main
advance in terms of ethical assumptions is to have dispensed with continuity. By
contrast, our Theorem 2.3.1 neither assumes nor implies completeness, continuity,
strong independence, strong separability across people, or the existence of a crit-
ical level for some history. When we further assume that the individual preorder
is strongly independent, we obtain a mixture-preserving total utility representa-
tion into a preordered vector space. As Pivato [90] notes, linearly ordered abelian
groups can always be embedded in lexicographically ordered vector spaces by the
Hahn embedding theorem, so subject to one qualification, our Propositions 3.4.2
and 3.4.4 cover this kind of representation as a special case. The qualification is
that Pivato’s framework is designed to allow for infinitesimal probabilities, whereas
we have assumed standard real-valued probabilities. But this assumption plays
no real role in either of our aggregation theorems. In brief, all we require is the
possibility of forming rational mixtures of lotteries.
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Harsanyi himself does not seem to have thought that his anonymous theorem
extends to the variable population case. His public discussion of the variable case
seems to be limited to an exchange reported in Ng [86]. Instead of applying his
anonymous theorem, Harsanyi recommends using the veil of ignorance described
in [62], along with the extension of the individual preorder to the variable case
discussed in Example 2.5.2, leading to a form of average utilitarianism.
This leads to a third way in which our work amplifies Harsanyi’s insights. We
think that appeals to a veil of ignorance require justification, especially in the vari-
able population case, where it is quite unclear how best to formulate the principle.
But a version of the veil turns out to be vindicated by Theorem 2.3.1. For any finite
population I ⊂ I∗ and lottery L ∈ LI, the lottery pIL defined in Theorem 2.3.1 can
be interpreted as the prospect faced by an individual behind a veil of ignorance,
in the sense that he has an equal chance of being any member of I under L. The
theorem then gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the social preorder to
be governed by the individual preorder for individuals behind the veil. The flexi-
bility of the individual preorder allows for a wide range of views about individual
rationality to be represented.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Section 1.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2. Suppose that L(U) = L′(U) for every measurable
and permutation-invariant U ⊂ H. We want to show L ∼ L′. Suppose given
measurable V ⊂W. We can write
(7)
# I ·pL(V ) =
∑
i∈I
Pi(L)(V )
=
∑
i∈I
L(W−1i (V )) =
# I∑
n=1
L
 ⋃
I⊂I
#I=n
⋂
i∈I
W−1i (V )
.
(For the last equation, note that if a history contributes its probability to exactly k
summands of the left-hand sum, then it also contributes to exactly k summands of
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the right-hand sum, namely those with n = 1, 2, . . . , k.) On the right hand side, all
arguments of L are measurable and permutation-invariant. We therefore find that
# I ·pL(V ) = # I ·pL′(V )
for arbitrary measurable V . Hence pL = pL′ . According to (1), we therefore have
L ∼ L′, as required for Posterior Anonymity. 
Section 2.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.3. For (i), suppose given L ∈ L∗I and i ∈ I∗ \I. Let U
be measurable in W∗ with Ω ∈ U . Then H∗I ⊂ (W∗i )−1(U), hence P∗i (L)(U) =
L((W∗i )−1(U)) = 1. Since this is true for every such U , we must have P∗i (L) = 1Ω.
For (ii), for any finite I, we have hΩ = HI(Ω) ∈ H∗.
For (iii), we have LI(1Ω) ∈ L∗, and we claim that LI(1Ω) = 1hΩ . Indeed, for any
measurable U ⊂ H∗ with hΩ ∈ U , we have Ω ∈ H−1I (U). Therefore LI(1Ω)(U) =
1Ω(H−1I (U)) = 1, as desired. Moreover, for any measurable U ⊂W∗ with Ω ∈ U , we
have, for any i ∈ I∗, hΩ ∈ W∗i −1(U). Therefore P∗i (1hΩ)(U) = 1hΩ(W∗i −1(U)) = 1.
Therefore P∗i (1hΩ) = 1Ω.
For (iv), suppose we have L ∈ L∗I , and P∗i (L) = 1Ω for all i ∈ I∗. Then
L(W∗i −1(W)) = P∗i (L)(W) = 0 for all i. Defining V :=
⋃
i∈IW∗i −1(W), we must
have L(V ) = 0. Suppose given measurable U ⊂ H∗ with hΩ /∈ U . We have
U ∩H∗I ⊂ V ∩H∗I , so L(U) ≤ L(V ), so L(U) = 0. Therefore L = 1hΩ . 
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. Suppose that L(U) = L′(U) for every measurable
and Σ∗-invariant U ⊂ H∗. We want to show L ∼∗ L′, and it suffices to show
that pIL = p
I
L′ if L,L
′ ∈ L∗I . Now, for any measurable W ⊂ W∗, pIL(W ) = 1 −
pIL(W
∗−W ). Since either Ω /∈W or Ω /∈W∗−W , it suffices to show that pIL(V ) =
pIL′(V ) for every measurable V ⊂W∗ such that Ω /∈ V .
For each number n, 1 ≤ n ≤ #I, let Un be the set of histories in which at least n
individuals have welfare levels in V ; and, for any finite population J, let U Jn be the
set of histories in which at least n individuals in J have welfare levels in V . That
is:
Un :=
⋃
I⊂I∗
#I=n
⋂
i∈I
W∗i −1(V ) U Jn :=
⋃
I⊂J
#I=n
⋂
i∈I
W∗i −1(V ).
On the assumption that Ω /∈ V , we have Un ∩ H∗J = U Jn ∩ H∗J . The sets U Jn are
measurable, and therefore Un ∩H∗J is measurable in H∗J . Since we assume that the
sigma algebra on H∗ is coherent, this shows that Un itself is measurable in H∗.
Following the proof of Proposition 1.3.2, and especially formula (7), we find
# I ·pIL(V ) =
#I∑
n=1
L(U In). =
#I∑
n=1
L(Un).
Since the sets Un are Σ
∗-invariant, L(Un) = L′(Un), so pIL(V ) = p
I
L′(V ), as desired.

The following proof was suggested by a result due to Milgram [79].
Proof of Theorem 2.4.2. Let (X,%X) be a preordered set. Define Ux := {y ∈
X | y %X x}, and let U := {Ux |x ∈ X}.
Let λ be the least ordinal whose cardinality is equal to that of U . Let ≥L be
the lexicographic order, a complete vector preorder, on the vector space V0 := Rλ.
That is, ≥L is an ordering, and (vβ) >L (wβ) if and only if the least β < λ such
that vβ 6= wβ is one such that vβ > wβ . Let (Uβ)β<λ be a well-ordering of the
members of U indexed by the ordinals less than λ.
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Define a function f : X → V0 by (f(x))β = 1 if x ∈ Uβ , 0 otherwise. It is easy
to see that if %X is complete, then f represents %X . But in general, let Σ be the
group of permutations on λ. Define σf : X → V0 by ((σf)(x))β = (f(x))σ−1β .
Define V to be the product space (V0)Σ, and equip V with the vector preorder %V
given by v %V w ⇐⇒ vσ ≥L wσ for all σ ∈ Σ. Finally, define F : X → V by
F (x)σ = (σf)(x). We claim that F represents %X . Equivalently,
(∗) x %X y ⇐⇒ (σf)(x) ≥L (σf)(y) ∀σ ∈ Σ.
To see this, note that for all σ ∈ Σ, x, y ∈ X, x X y =⇒ (σf)(x) >L (σf)(y)
and x ∼ y =⇒ (σf)(x) = (σf)(y). Suppose x upriseX y. Then there is a least
ordinal γ such that (f(x))γ = 1 and (f(y))γ = 0, and a least ordinal δ such that
(f(x))δ = 0 and (f(y))δ = 1. Let σ
′ ∈ Σ be the permutation (γδ). If γ < δ, then
f(x) >L f(y) but (σ
′f)(y) >L (σ′f)(x). Similarly, if δ < γ, then f(y) >L f(x) but
(σ′f)(x) >L (σ′f)(y). These observations establish (∗). 
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1. (i) Applying Theorem 2.4.2 to X = PΩ, we have a
representation U : PΩ → V of %PΩ , for some preordered vector space (V,%V). Since
P∗ includes P, each member of P∗ can be written in the form Pα := αP + (1−α)1Ω
for some P ∈ P, α ∈ [0, 1]. This presentation is unique except when α = 0. Define
a function U˜ : P∗ → V by the rule
U˜(Pα) = αU(P ) + (1− α)U(1Ω).
Let %P∗ be the preorder on P∗ represented by U˜ . We claim that %P∗ is Omega
Independent and includes %PΩ .
For all P ∈ PΩ, U˜(P ) = U(P ), so %P∗ includes %PΩ . To show that %P∗ satisfies
Omega Independence, suppose P , P ′ ∈ P∗, and let α ∈ (0, 1)∩Q. We wish to show
that P %P∗ P ′ ⇐⇒ Pα %P∗ P ′α. We have P = Qβ and P ′ = Q′γ for some Q,
Q′ ∈ P, β, γ ∈ [0, 1]. Then Pα = Qαβ and P ′α = Q′αγ . Thus:
P %P∗ P ′ ⇐⇒ U˜(P ) %V U˜(P ′)
⇐⇒ βU(Q) + (1− β)U(1Ω) %V γU(Q′) + (1− γ)U(1Ω)
⇐⇒ αβU(Q) + (1− αβ)U(1Ω) %V αγU(Q′) + (1− αγ)U(1Ω)
⇐⇒ U˜(Pα) %V U˜(P ′α)
⇐⇒ Pα %P∗ P ′α
Here the third line uses the fact that v 7→ αv+ (1−α)U(1Ω) is an order-preserving
transformation of V. This establishes that %P∗ is Omega Independent and includes
%PΩ .
(ii) Suppose first that for some Q 6= Q′ ∈ PΩ, Q %PΩ Q′. For P , P ′ ∈ P∗, define
P %P∗ P ′ ⇐⇒ (P = P ′) ∨ (P %PΩ P ′). This is a preorder on P∗ that includes
%PΩ . But since Q %P∗ Q′ and 12Q +
1
21Ω upriseP∗
1
2Q
′ + 121Ω, %P∗ violates Omega
Independence.
Suppose instead that for all Q 6= Q′ ∈ PΩ, QuprisePΩQ′. Let P0 ∈ P. For P , P ′ ∈ P∗,
define P %P∗ P ′ ⇐⇒ (P = P ′) ∨ ((P = 12P0 + 121Ω) ∧ (P ′ = 1Ω)). This is also
a preorder on P∗ that includes %PΩ . But since 12P0 +
1
21Ω P∗ 1Ω and P0 upriseP∗ 1Ω,
%P∗ violates Omega Independence.
(iii) The fact that MI is a constant population model is easy to verify from the
construction in the text; then (1) is immediate from (2).
(iv) Suppose M = 〈I,W,P,%P,H,L,%〉 is a constant population model satisfying
(1). P∗ includes P, so that we are given W∗, and we are also given an Omega
Independent %P∗ that includes %P.
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We wish to describe a variable population modelM∗ = 〈I∗,W∗,P∗,%P∗ ,H∗,L∗,%∗
〉 satisfying (2). Let I∗ be any infinite population with I ⊂ I∗ and associated group
of permutations Σ∗; we need to define H∗, L∗ and %∗.
We first define H∗. For h ∈ H, let ι(h) be the history in (W∗)I∗ such that
(ι(h))(i) = h(i) if i ∈ I, Ω otherwise. For w ∈ W∗ and finite J ⊂ I∗, let H∗J (w)
denote the history in (W∗)I∗ given by H∗J (w)(i) = w if i ∈ J, Ω otherwise.
Define
H∗ := Σ∗(ι(H)) ∪ {H∗J (w) : J ⊂ I∗ is finite, w ∈W∗}
For any i ∈ I∗ and finite J ⊂ I∗, the functions ι : H → H∗, W∗i : H∗ → W∗ and
H∗J : W∗ → H∗ are then well-defined, and H∗ is Σ∗-invariant.
Let F be the sigma algebra of H. Equip H∗ with the sigma algebra F∗ defined
as the smallest sigma algebra containing ι(F) which makes the action of Σ∗ on H∗
and the functions W∗i measurable. Thus F is generated by
G := Σ∗(ι(F)) ∪ {(W∗i )−1(U) : i ∈ I∗, U is measurable in W∗}
One can now show each H∗J is measurable; we omit verification.
We define the preorder %∗ on L∗ via (2). Since %P∗ is Omega Independent, this
is well-defined.
One can now show that M∗ = 〈I∗,W∗,P∗,%P∗ ,H∗,L∗,%∗〉 is a variable pop-
ulation model which satisfies (2); we again omit detailed verification. Let MI =
〈I,W,P,%P,HI,LI,%I〉 be the restriction of M∗ to I. It is straightforward to show
that H = HI, L = LI, and %=%I. This shows that MI = M, establishing that M∗
includes M, contains %P∗ , and satisfies (2) as needed. 
Section 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.1. The proofs of (i) and (iii) are exactly parallel, so of
these we will present only (iii). Moreover, the claim about (O) is obvious; the proofs
for the other cases use the fact that for any L, M ∈ L∗I , α ∈ (0, 1), pIαL+(1−α)M =
αpIL + (1− α)pIM . They are very similar, so we only present the proof for (Ii).
To show that %P∗ satisfies (Ii) ⇐⇒ %∗ satisfies (Ii) for i = 1, 2, 3, it is sufficient
to establish it for i = a, b, c. Let the symbol  stand for ∼, , or uprise, corresponding
i = a, b, c.
Suppose given L, L′, M ∈ L∗, α ∈ (0, 1). For some finite I ⊂ I∗, L, L′, M ∈ L∗I .
Then for i = a, b, c:
L ∗ L′ =⇒ pIL P∗ pIL′ (%P∗ generates %∗)
=⇒ αpIL + (1− α)pIM P∗ αpIL′ + (1− α)pIM ((Ii) for %P∗)
=⇒ pIαL+(1−α)M P∗ pIαL′+(1−α)M
=⇒ αL+ (1− α)M ∗ αL′ + (1− α)M (%P∗ generates %∗)
This shows that (Ii) for %P∗ implies (Ii) for %∗. Conversely, suppose given P,Q,R ∈
P∗. Then
P P∗ Q =⇒ LI(P ) ∗ LI(Q) (%P∗ generates %∗)
=⇒ αLI(P ) + (1− α)LI(R) ∗ αLI(Q) + (1− α)LI(R) ((Ii) for %∗)
=⇒ αP + (1− α)R P∗ αP + (1− α)R (%P∗ generates %∗).
So (Ii) for %∗ implies (Ii) for %P∗ .
Now let us turn to (ii). First a general observation. Suppose given topological
spaces X,Y with preorders %X ,%Y , and a function f : X → Y . Assume (A) that
f is continuous, and (B) that for all a, b ∈ X, a %X b ⇐⇒ f(a) %Y f(b). Then,
we claim, if %Y is continuous, so is %X . Indeed, for any q ∈ X, we find
{p ∈ X : p %X q} = {p ∈ X : f(p) %Y f(q)} = f−1{y ∈ Y : y %Y f(q)}.
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The right-hand side is the inverse image of a closed set under a continuous function,
so it is closed. A similar calculation shows that {p ∈ X : q %X p} is closed; hence
%X is continuous.
Taking f = L : P → L, assumption (A) is part of (Top), and assumption (B)
follows from Reduction to Prospects. We conclude that, if % is continuous, so is
%P. Conversely, define f : L→ P by f(L) = pL. Assumption (A) follows from the
continuity of mixing and of every Pi, whereas (B) is part of what it means for % to
be generated by %P. We conclude that, if %P is continuous, so is %.
As for (iv), the same logic just used shows that %P∗ is continuous if and only if
the restriction of %∗ to each and every L∗I is continuous. Now, if %∗ is continous
on L∗, then its restriction to every L∗I is continuous; given topological coherence
from (Top∗), we may conclude the converse. Indeed, assume that the restriction
of %∗ to every L∗I is continuous. It suffices to show that, for any L0 ∈ L∗, the set
X = {L ∈ L∗ : L %∗ L0} is closed in L∗ (and similarly that {L ∈ L∗ : L0 %∗ L} is
closed). By topological coherence, it suffices to show that X ∩ L∗I is closed in L∗I ,
for every I. Suppose that L0 is in L∗J , and let K = I ∪ J, so L0 is also in L∗K. Then
X ∩ L∗K is closed in L∗K, by the continuity of %∗ on L∗K. That means there is some
closed V ⊂ L∗ such that V ∩L∗K = X ∩L∗K. But then X ∩L∗I = V ∩L∗I is closed in
L∗I , as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1. We have %I satisfies (IQi ) ⇐⇒ %Pg satisfies (IQi )
from Proposition 3.1.1, so it will be enough to argue that (Si) ⇐⇒ (IQi ) ⇐⇒ (Pi)
for i = 1, 2, 3, where (IQi ) is the condition on %Pg .
We first argue that (Si) ⇐= (IQi ) =⇒ (Pi) for i = 1, 2, 3. It will be sufficient
to show that (Si) ⇐= [(IQa )&(IQi )] =⇒ (Pi) for i = a, b, c. So suppose we have
(IQa ) and (I
Q
i ). Let the symbol  stand for ∼, , or uprise, corresponding i = a, b, c. We
claim
(D1) For i = a, b, c, the antecedent of each of (Si) and (Pi) implies p
K
L ∼Pg pKL′ .
(D2) For i = a, b, c, the antecedent of each of (Si) and (Pi) implies p
J
L Pg pJL′ .
Granted (D1) and (D2), we can deduce pIL P∗ pIL′ by assuming the antecedent of
either (Si) or (Pi):
pIL =
#J
#I p
J
L +
#K
#I p
K
L
∼Pg #J#I pJL + #K#I pKL′ (IQa ) and (D1)
Pg #J#I pJL′ + #K#I pKL′ (IQi ) and (D2)
= pIL′
Since %P∗ generates %∗, we find L I L′, validating both (Si) and (Pi). It remains
to prove (D1) and (D2).
Suppose the antecedent of (Si) is satisfied, so that L|K ∼K L′|K. Then pKL =
pKL|K ∼Pg pKL′|K = pKL′ , as claimed by (D1). Similar reasoning shows p
J
L = p
J
L|J Pg
pJL′|J = p
J
L′ , as claimed by (D2).
Suppose instead that the antecedent of (Pi) is satisfied, so that L ≈KPg L′. This
means that Pk(L) ∼Pg Pk(L′) for all k ∈ K. We obtain pKL ∼Pg pKL′ , as claimed
by (D1), by repeatedly applying (IQa ). If i = a or i = b, then p
J
L Pg pJL′ follows
by a similar method. The case i = c is slightly more complicated. Choose any
j ∈ J. Since Pk(L) ∼Pg Pj(L) for any other k ∈ J, we can deduce pJL ∼Pg Pj(L)
by repeatedly applying (IQa ). Similarly, p
J
L′ ∼Pg Pj(L′). Since Pj(L)uprisePg Pj(L′), we
obtain pJL Pg pJL′ , completing the proof of (D2).
UTILITARIANISM WITH AND WITHOUT EXPECTED UTILITY 47
We now argue that (Si) =⇒ (IQi ) ⇐= (Pi) for i = 1, 2, 3, and indeed for each
of i = a, b, c. Suppose given p, p′, q ∈ Pg and α ∈ (0, 1)∩Q. Let P := αp+(1−α)q,
P ′ := αp′ + (1 − α)q. It suffices to show that, given i ∈ {a, b, c}, each of (Si) and
(Pi) implies p Pg p′ =⇒ P Pg P ′.
Let J, K ⊂ I∗ be finite with J ∩ K = ∅ such that #J#K = α1−α . Let I := J ∪ K.
If F is compositional, we can find L,L′ ∈ LI such that Pj(L) = p and Pj(L′) = p′
for all j ∈ J, and Pk(L) = Pk(L′) = q for all k ∈ K. Then pIL = P and pIL′ =
P ′. Alternatively, if F is the restriction of a variable population model, then set
L := 12LJ(p) + 12LK(q) and L′ := 12LJ(p′) + 12LK(q). Then pIL = 12P + 121Ω and
pIL′ =
1
2P
′ + 121Ω. Under either assumption, L I L′ ⇐⇒ pIL Pg pIL′ ⇐⇒ P Pg P ′
(using Omega Independence in the second case). In addition, the antecedent of
each of (Si) and (Pi) holds if and only if p Pg p′. Tracing backwards, we see that
if p Pg p′, then P Pg P ′, as claimed by (IQi ).

Lemma A.0.1 (Bogachev [20, Thm 3.6.1]). Let X and Y be measurable spaces.
Let f : X → Y and g : Y → R be measurable functions, and let µ be a nonnegative
measure on X. Then µ ◦ f−1 is a measure on Y and g is integrable with respect to
µ ◦ f−1 on Y precisely when g ◦ f is integrable with respect to µ. In addition, one
has ∫
Y
g d(µ ◦ f−1) =
∫
X
g ◦ f dµ.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1. We will present the proofs in the variable popula-
tion case, since those in the constant population case are exactly parallel.
Suppose %P∗ satisfies Vector EUT with respect to some (V,%V,A); the standard
EUT case is covered by (R,≥, {id}). For any L ∈ L∗ and Λ ∈ A, Lemma A.0.1
above yields∫
W∗
Λ ◦ u dPi(L) =
∫
W∗
Λ ◦ u d(L ◦ (W∗i )−1) =
∫
H∗
Λ ◦ u ◦W∗i dL.
Using this we compute that for any finite I ⊂ I∗,∫
W∗
Λ ◦ u dpIL =
∫
W∗
Λ ◦ u d
(
1
# I
∑
i∈I
Pi(L)
)
=
1
# I
∑
i∈I
∫
W∗
Λ ◦ u dPi(L)
=
∫
H∗
1
# I
∑
i∈I
Λ ◦ u ◦W∗i dL =
∫
H∗
Λ ◦ 1
# I
∑
i∈I
u ◦W∗i dL.
Therefore, by definition of the V-valued integral,∫
W∗
u dpIL =
∫
H∗
1
# I
∑
i∈I
u ◦W∗i dL.
Let L, L′ ∈ L∗I . Since %∗ is generated by %P∗ ,
L %∗ L′ ⇐⇒ pIL %P∗ pIL′
⇐⇒
∫
H∗
1
# I
∑
i∈I
u ◦W∗i dL %V
∫
H∗
1
# I
∑
i∈I
u ◦W∗i dL′
⇐⇒
∫
H∗
∑
i∈I∗
(u ◦W∗i − u(Ω)) dL %V
∫
H∗
∑
i∈I∗
(u ◦W∗i − u(Ω)) dL′.
The last step uses the fact that, in a preordered vector space, the transformation
v 7→ #Iv−#Iu(Ω) is order-preserving. This shows that %∗ satisfies Vector EUT for
the same triple (V,%V,A), and is in particular represented by the stated function
V .
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A similar calculation shows that if v is a utility function (integrand) for %∗, then
v ◦ H∗I is a utility function for %P∗ , for any finite nonempty I. This shows that if
%∗ satisfies Vector EUT, then so does %P∗ . 
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. It is clear that %X satisfies (I3) if it has an MP rep-
resentation. Indeed, for p, p′, q ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1), p %X p′ ⇐⇒ U(p) %V
U(p′) ⇐⇒ αU(p) + (1−α)U(q) %V αU(p′) + (1−α)U(q) ⇐⇒ αp+ (1−α)q %X
αp′+ (1−α)q. (The second biconditional follows from the definition of ‘preordered
vector space’.)
Conversely, suppose that %X satisfies (I3). Let V = span(X). (By definition, a
convex set like X is a subset of a vector space. When X = P∗, the vector space is the
space of signed measures onW∗.) Define C ⊂ V by C := {λ(q−q′) : λ > 0, q %X q′}.
Define a binary relation %V on V by r %V s ⇐⇒ r − s ∈ C. It is well known, and
easy to check, that this construction makes V into a preordered vector space.
Let U be the inclusion of X into V. It is obviously mixture preserving, and
p %X p′ =⇒ U(p) %V U(p′). It remains to show that U(p) %V U(p′) =⇒ p %X p′.
If U(p) %V U(p′), then there must be λ > 0 and q, q′ ∈ X with q %X q′ and
p − p′ = λ(q − q′). Let α := 11+λ . Then αp + (1 − α)q′ = αp′ + (1 − α)q. This,
together with the fact that %X satisfies (I3), yields q %X q′ =⇒ αp′+(1−α)q %X
αp′ + (1− α)q′ =⇒ αp+ (1− α)q′ %X αp′ + (1− α)q′ =⇒ p %X p′, as desired.

Proof of Proposition 3.4.2. The first statement follows from Theorem 3.4.1 and
Proposition 3.1.1. Suppose now given an MP representation U : P∗ → V. For
L,L′ ∈ L∗I , we have
L %∗ L′ ⇐⇒ pIL %V pIL′ (%P∗ generates %∗)
⇐⇒ U(pIL) %V U(pIL′) (U represents %P∗)
⇐⇒ ∑i∈I U(P∗i (L)) %V ∑i∈I U(P∗i (L′)) (U mixture preserving).
This last inequality is in turn equivalent to∑
i∈I∗
[U(P∗i (L))− U(1Ω)] %V
∑
i∈I∗
[U(P∗i (L′))− U(1Ω)].
This shows that
∑
i∈I∗(U ◦ Pi−U(1Ω)) represents %∗. It is easy to check that this
function is mixture preserving, so it is an MP representation of %∗. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4.3. Given a set R and an ordered set C, we can make
V := RR×C into a preordered vector space, by the following rule: (xab) %V (yab) if
and only if, for each a ∈ R, either xab = yab for all b ∈ C, or there is a largest b ∈ C
such that xab 6= yab, and, for that b, xab > yab. An LMP representation is an MP
representation with values in a preordered vector space of this form. In particular,
by Theorem 3.4.1, to have an LMP representation, %X must satisfy (I3).
Conversely, by Theorem 3.4.1, if %X satisfies (I3) then it has an MP representa-
tion U with values in some preordered vector space V. To prove the first statement
of the theorem, it remains to find an LMP representation {U˜ab} of %V, for then
{U˜ab ◦ U} is an LMP representation of %X .
To do this, apply Theorem 3.4.5. Let R be the set of complete vector preorders
extending %V. For a ∈ R, let (Oa,Ga) be a corresponding lexicographic filtration,
guaranteed to exist by Theorem 3.4.5. Let C be the disjoint union of the sets Oa;
choose any ordering on it that restricts to the given ordering on each Oa. For each
b ∈ Oa ⊂ C, we have a function gb ∈ Ga; extend gb arbitrarily to a linear map
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V→ R. Now, for each (a, b) ∈ R× C and v ∈ V, define
U˜ab(v) =
{
gb(v) if b is in Oa ⊂ C
0 if not.
Let us verify that this is an LMP representation of %V. Fix v, w ∈ V. For LMP1,
fix a ∈ R, and suppose that Uab(v) 6= Uab(w) for some b ∈ C. Then U˜ab(v) =
U˜ab(w) = 0 unless b ∈ Oa, so it suffices to show that there is a largest b ∈ Oa with
gb(v) 6= gb(w). Since (Oa,Ga) is a lexicographic filtration, we can can take b to be
the largest element of Oa containing v − w. Moreover, for this b, gb(v) > gb(w) if
and only if v %comV w for the complete extension %comV corresponding to (Oa,Ga).
LMP2 therefore follows from the first statement of Theorem 3.4.5.
For the third statement, concerning (MC), having an LMP representation with
C = 1 means there is a set R indexing a family of mixture-preserving functions
{Ua : X → R}a∈R such that p %X q iff Ua(p) % Ua(q) for all a. It is easy to see
that, in this case, %X must satisfy (MC); for example, given p, q, r ∈ X, the set
{α ∈ [0, 1] : αp + (1 − α)r %X q} is the intersection of the closed sets {α ∈ [0, 1] :
αUa(p) + (1 − α)Ua(r) ≥ Ua(q)}, and is therefore closed. (It is worth noting that
%X may not satisfy (Ar).)
Conversely, suppose that %X satisfies (MC) as well as (I3). As before, we obtain
an MP representation of %X from Theorem 3.4.1. We claim that the preordered
vector space (V,%V) constructed in the proof of that theorem satisfies (MC). In-
deed, suppose given u, v, w ∈ V, and let A = {λ(x − x′) : λ > 0, x, x′ ∈ X} be the
affine hull of X in V. Note that the positive cone C is contained in A. If u− v /∈ A
or w−v /∈ A, there is therefore at most one α ∈ [0, 1] such that αu+(1−α)w %V v,
so the set of such α is closed. Otherwise, we have u − v = λ1(x − x′) and
w − v = λ2(y − y′) for some x, x′, y, y′ ∈ X and λ1, λ2 > 0. Set βi = λi/(λ1 + λ2),
p = (β1x+ (1− β1)x′ + y′)/2, q = (x′ + y′)/2, r = (x′ + β2y + (1− β2)y′)/2. Then
we have p, q, r ∈ X and a direct calculation shows that, for any α ∈ [0, 1],
αp+ (1− α)r − q = 1
λ1 + λ2
(αu+ (1− α)w − v).
Therefore αu + (1 − α)w %V v ⇐⇒ αp + (1 − α)r %V q. Since the restriction of
%V to X equals %X , and %X satisfies (MC), %V must also satisfy (MC).
It suffices, then, to show that a preordered vector space that satisfies (MC) has
an LMP representation with #C = 1. Let R be the set of complete, mixture-
continuous vector preorders extending %V; by the last part of Theorem 3.4.5, each
a ∈ R gives rise to a representing function gaV : V → R. Moreover, we get the
desired LMP representation {U˜a} by defining U˜a = gaV.
Finally, consider the second and fourth statements to be proved, concerning
(O). It is easy to see the any LMP representation with #R = 1 ensures that
%X is complete. Conversely, suppose that %X satisfies (I3) and (O), and again
let (V,%V) be the preordered vector space constructed in the proof of Theorem
3.4.1. As constructed, %V may not be complete. However, choose any x0 ∈ X,
and set V0 = Span({x − x0 : u ∈ X}) = {λ(p − q) : λ > 0, p, q ∈ X}, and define
U0(x) = x−x0; then the restriction %V0 of %V to V0 is complete, and U0 is an MP
representation of %X in V0. As before, %V0 also satisfies (MC) if and only if %X
does.
Now, whether or not %V0 satisfies (MC), the above constructions of LMP rep-
resentations of preordered vector spaces produce LMP representations of %V0 with
#R = 1. Composing with U0, these in determine LMP representations of %X ,
proving the second and fourth statements of the theorem. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.4. The first statement follows from Theorem 3.4.3 and
Proposition 3.1.1. As for the second, we explained in the proof of Theorem 3.4.4
that an LMP representation {Uab} amounts to an MP representation U with values
in V = RR×C . Proposition 3.4.2 applies to this MP representation to give the
desired result. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4.5. Suppose that (V,%V) is a preordered vector space, as
in the first part of the theorem.
Lemma A.0.2. Suppose given v0 ∈ V such that v0 upriseV 0. Then there exists a
complete vector preorder %comV extending %V such that v0 ≺comV 0. If %V satisfies
(MC), then we can choose %comV also to satisfy (MC).
Proof. Let us show that there exists a vector preorder %′V, not necessarily complete,
extending %V and such that v0 ≺′V 0. In fact, we can define %′V by the rule:
w %′V 0 ⇐⇒ ∃λ ≥ 0 : w + λv0 %V 0.
Then, by Zorn’s Lemma, a maximal such extension %comV exists. This extension
must be complete, since otherwise we could find a further extension using the same
trick.
For the claim about (MC), we just have to show that %′V satisfies (MC) if %V
does. Given u, v, w ∈ V, let A(u, v, w) = {α ∈ [0, 1] : αu + (1 − α)w − v %V 0}
and A′(u, v, w) = {α ∈ [0, 1] : αu+ (1− α)w − v %′V 0}. (MC) for %V implies that
A(u, v, w) is always closed, and we have to check that A′(u, v, w) is closed.
Let V0 = Span{u− v, w − v, v0}, and C0 = {v ∈ V0 : v %V 0}. We use the fact
that a convex subset C of a finite-dimensional vector space like V0 is closed if and
only if, for all x, y ∈ V0, the set B(x, y, C) = {α ∈ [0, 1] : αx + (1 − α)y ∈ C}
is closed. (The left-to-right direction is obvious. Right-to-left, suppose x is in the
relative boundary of C. Choose y in the relative interior; by [93, Theorem 6.1],
B(x, y, C) contains [0, 1), so must equal [0, 1]; hence x ∈ C.) Since B(x, y, C0) =
A(x, 0, y) is closed for all x, y ∈ V0, C0 is closed. It follows from [93, Corollary
9.1.3] that C ′0 := C0 + {λv0 : λ ≤ 0} is also closed in V0. Since A′(u, v, w) =
B(u− v, w − v, C ′0), it is closed, as desired. 
To prove the first part of the theorem, suppose that v %V w. Then v %comV w,
for all complete vector preorders %comV extending %V, by definition of ‘extending’.
Conversely, suppose that v %comV w, or equivalently v0 := v−w %comV 0, for all such
%comV . We cannot have v0 ≺V 0, for that would require v0 ≺comV 0. Nor can we
have v0 upriseV 0: by Lemma A.0.2, we would then have some %comV with v0 ≺comV 0.
Therefore we must have v0 %V 0, hence v %V w, as desired.
Now for the second part of the theorem. For each v ∈ V, write |v| = v if v ≥ 0,
and |v| = −v if v < 0. Define
W+v = {w ∈ V : λ|v| %comV |w| for some real number λ > 0}
W−v = {w ∈ V : λ|v| comV |w| for all real numbers λ > 0}.
Let O = {W+v : v ∈ V}. Clearly W−v ⊂W+v . It is also easy to check
(a) W+w ⊆W+v ⇐⇒ w ∈W+v ⇐⇒ v /∈W−w ⇐⇒ W+v 6⊆W−w .
It follows that O is completely ordered by inclusion: either W+w ⊆ W+v , or else
W+v ⊆ W−w ⊆ W+w . Moreover, W+w is the smallest element of O containing w: for
if w ∈W+v then W+w ⊆W+v .
To get a lexicographic filtration, it suffices to produce for each W ∈ O a linear
map gW : W → R satisfying the following two conditions:
(b) For w ∈W , gW (w) = 0 ⇐⇒ W+w (W or W = W+0 .
UTILITARIANISM WITH AND WITHOUT EXPECTED UTILITY 51
(c) For v, w ∈ V with v, w %comV 0,
v %comV w ⇐⇒ W+v ⊇W+w and gW+v (v) ≥ gW+v (w).
To do it, choose v0 such that W = W
+
v0 . If v0 ∼V 0, so that W = W+0 , define
gW = 0; otherwise, define gW (w) = inf{λ ∈ R : λ|v0| %comV w}. (The infimum
exists. If w = |w|, then this set of λ is non-empty by definition of W+v0 , and
bounded below by 0; if w = −|w|, then the infimum equals −gW (|w|).)
First let us check that gW is linear. This is trivial when W = W
+
0 , so suppose
W = W+v0 with v0 6∼V 0. In fact we claim that W+v = W−v ⊕ R|v0|, and that
w 7→ gW (w)|v0| is the projection onto the second factor. Therefore gW is linear. To
prove the claim, it suffices to show that w − gW (w)|v0| lies in W−v0 . By definition
of gW , we know that
(gW (w) + µ1)|v0| %comV w %comV (gW (w)− µ2)|v0|
for any real µ1, µ2 > 0. Rearranging,
µ1|v0| %comV w − gW (w)|v0| %comV −µ2|v0|.
If w− gW (w)|v0| %comV 0, then the inequality on the left shows that w− gW (w)|v0|
is in W−v0 ; on the other hand, if w − gW (w)|v0| ≺V 0, then the inequality on the
right does the same.
Now let us check that the gW we have defined satisfy condition (b). Assuming
that W 6= W0, we have from the definitions that gW+v (w) = 0 ⇐⇒ w ∈ W−v . We
also have from (a) that w ∈W−v ⇐⇒ W+w (W+v . That proves (b).
As for (c), the left-to-right implication follows easily from the definition of the
subspaces W+v and the functions gW+v . Conversely, suppose that W
+
v ⊆ W+w and
gW+v (v) ≥ gW+v (w). Then v − w ∈W+v , and gW+v (v − w) = gW+v (v)− gW+v (w) ≥ 0.
From the definition of gW+v we must have v %
com
V w.
Finally, let us show that the lexicographic filtration is unique in the stated sense.
First, given a lexicographic filtration (O,G), it is easy to check that Wv satisfies
the definition of W+v . This shows that O is uniquely determined. Second, gW0 = 0,
so is completely determined. For Wv 6= W0, the kernel of gWv is {w : Ww ( Wv}.
So the kernel is completely determined, and gWv assigns |v| a positive value. This
determines gWv up to positive scale.
As for part (3) of the theorem, if %V satisfies (MC), then the construction of
Lemma A.0.2 yields complete extensions that also satisfy (MC), and the subsequent
argument goes through to prove the addendum to part (1). As for the addendum
to part (2), suppose that the lexicographic filtration for %comV contains Wv )Ww )
W0. Then the set of α ∈ [0, 1] such that α|v| + (1 − α)0 %comV |w| equals (0, 1],
contradicting (MC). So, given (MC), O = {V,W0} with gV 6= 0, or O = {W0}, in
which case V = W0 and gV = 0. 
Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 4.1.1. Suppose upper-measurable %P∗ satisfies (M). For
(ii), let L, L′ ∈ L∗. Suppose that Pi(L) %SDP∗ Pi(L′) for all i ∈ I∗ and Pj(L) SDP∗
Pj(L′) for some j ∈ I∗. Then L, L′ ∈ LI for some finite I ⊂ I∗ with j ∈ I, and for
all upper A ⊂ W∗, Pi(L)(A) ≥ Pi(L′)(A) for all i ∈ I and Pj(L)(A) ≥ Pj(L′)(A),
hence pIL(A) > p
I
L′(A). This implies pL SDP∗ pL′ by (M), hence L ∗ L′ by
Theorem 2.3.1. The proof of (i) is similar. 
Proof of Proposition 4.1.3. Suppose given P,Q,R ∈ P∗ and α ∈ (0, 1). Write
[P,R] for the mixture αP + (1− α)R.
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Suppose first of all that P and Q have rational probability values. It follows
that, for some common denominator N , any population I of size N , and some
Pi, Qi ∈W∗, we can write
P =
1
N
∑
i∈I
1Pi Q =
1
N
∑
i∈I
1Qi .
It follows that there is some HP ∈ H∗I with W∗i (HP ) = Pi for all i ∈ I; we therefore
have a lottery LP := 1HP with p
I
LP
= P . Similarly for Q.
Since %P∗ is complete, either P %P∗ Q or Q %P∗ P ; hence, by Theorem 2.3.1,
either LP %∗ LQ or LQ %∗ LP . Since LP and LQ are delta-measures, [LP ,LI(R)]
stochastically dominates [LQ,LI(R)] if LP %∗ LQ, and vice versa if LQ %∗ LP .
Applying (M), we find
[LP ,LI(R)] %∗ [LQ,LI(R)] ⇐⇒ LP %∗ LQ.
Now, pI[LP ,LI(R)] = [P,R] and p
I
[LQ,LI(R)] = [Q,R]. So the aggregation theorem gives
[P,R] %P∗ [Q,R] ⇐⇒ [LP ,LI(R)] %∗ [LQ,LI(R)] ⇐⇒ LP %∗ LQ ⇐⇒ P %P∗ Q.
This establishes (I3) for %P∗ under the assumption that P,Q have rational values.
Suppose now that P,Q are general. Then we can find a sequence (Ai) in P∗
strongly converging to P such that each Ai has rational values, and each Ai stochas-
tically dominates P . Similarly choose a sequence (Bi) converging to Q such that
each Bi has rational values and Q stochastically dominates each Bi. Note that (M)
for %∗ and Reduction to Prospects imply that %P∗ satisfies (M). Thus Ai %P∗ P and
Q %P∗ Bi. Using this, the result for rational-probability prospects, and continuity,
we have
P %P∗ Q =⇒ ∀ij.Ai %P∗ Bj ⇐⇒ ∀ij.[Ai, R] %P∗ [Bj , R] =⇒ [P,R] %P∗ [Q,R].
Moreover, the first and last implications are reversible using continuity and (M)
respectively. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2.1. Suppose V : P → R is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable
at p. There exists vp ∈ ∇Vp such that V (p) =
∫
Y
vp dp: for any up ∈ ∇Vp, set
vp := up + V (p)−
∫
Y
up dp. By definition of ∇Vp, for any q ∈ P and t ∈ [0, 1],
V (p+ t(q − p)) = V (p) + t
∫
Y
vp d(q − p) + o(t).
This rearranges to (3). Conversely, if V satisfies (3) for some function vp, it follows
that V ′p(q − p) =
∫
Y
vp d(q − p), hence V is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2.2. Part (i) is immediate from the constant population
aggregation theorem and the fact that U , hence #IU , represents %P.
For part (ii), suppose that U is Gaˆteaux differentiable at pL. Then V (L+ t(M −
L)) = #IU(pL + t(pM − pL)), so V ′L(M − L) = #IU ′pL(pM − pL).
For part (iii), suppose that U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at pL. Fix
uL ∈ ∇UpL . For any M ∈ P we have #I
∫
W uL dpM =
∫
W
∑
i∈I uL d(Pi(M)) =∫
W
∑
i∈I uL d(M ◦ W−1i ) =
∫
H
∑
i∈I uL ◦ Wi dM , using Lemma A.0.1. This shows
that
∑
i∈I uL ◦ Wi is L-integrable. Moreover, V ′L(M − L) = #IU ′pL(pM − pL) =
#I
∫
W uL d(pM −pL) =
∫
H
∑
i∈I uL ◦Wi d(M −L). This establishes part (iii) of the
proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2.3. Part (i) is immediate from the variable population
aggregation theorem and the fact that U∗, hence #IU∗−#IU∗(Ω), represents %P∗ .
For (ii) and (iii) we use the following Lemma, proved below.
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Lemma A.0.3. Suppose U∗ is an Omega-linear function on P∗. For any P ∈ P∗
and α ∈ [0, 1], define Pα = αP + (1− α)1Ω. Then:
(a) If U∗ is Gaˆteaux differentiable at P ∈ P∗, then it is Gaˆteaux differentiable at
Pα, for any α ∈ [0, 1].
(b) If U∗ is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at P ∈ P∗, then it is integrally Gaˆteaux
differentiable at Pα, for any α ∈ (0, 1]; moreover, ∇U∗P ⊆ ∇U∗Pα .
For (ii), suppose that U∗ is Gaˆteaux-differentiable at pIL. Note that, for J ⊃ I,
pJL is a mixture of p
I
L and 1Ω; thus, by the lemma, U
∗ is Gaˆteaux-differentiable
at pJL for all J ⊃ I. Given M ∈ L∗, we can therefore enlarge I to ensure M ∈
L∗I . We then have V ∗(L + t(M − L)) = #IU∗(pIL + t(pIM − pIL)) − #IU∗(1Ω), so
(V ∗)′L(M − L) = #I(U∗)′pIL(p
I
M − pIL).
For (iii), suppose that U∗ is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at pIL. By the
lemma, we can find some uL such that in fact uL ∈ ∇UpJL for every J ⊃ I. So we
can again enlarge I to ensure that any given M is in L∗I .
Now define fI :=
∑
i∈I(uL◦W∗i −uL(Ω)). Then f :=
∑
i∈I∗(uL◦W∗i −uL(Ω)) is a
well-defined function on H∗, and f(h) = fI(h) for all h ∈ H∗I . Since each fI is mea-
surable, we find that f is measurable on each H∗I , so, by coherence, measurable on
H∗. Moreover, a calculation similar to that in the proof of Proposition 4.2.2 shows
that fI is L∗I -integrable; therefore f is L
∗-integrable. In particular the calculation
gives
∫
H∗ f dM =
∫
H∗I
fI dM = #I
∫
W∗(uL − uL(Ω)) dpIM for M ∈ L∗I . Now, we au-
tomatically have uL − uL(Ω) ∈ ∇UpIL . Therefore, for M,L ∈ L
∗
I , (V
∗)′L(M − L) =
#I(U∗)′
pIL
(pIM − pIL) = #I
∫
W(uL − uL(Ω)) d(pIM − pIL) =
∫
H∗ f d(M − L). This
establishes part (iii) of the proposition. 
Proof of Lemma A.0.3. For any Q ∈ P∗ and β ∈ [0, 1], we claim
(8)
(U∗)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) =
{
β(U∗(Q)− U∗(1Ω)), if α = 0;
β(U∗)′P (Q− P ) + (β − α)(U∗(P )− U∗(1Ω)), if α ∈ (0, 1].
To see this, set f(t) := U∗(Pα + t(Qβ − Pα)). First consider α = 0. Then Pα = 1Ω.
We have f(t) = U∗(Qtβ) = tβU∗(Q) + (1− tβ)U∗(1Ω). Hence (U∗)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) =
∂+f(t)|t=0 = β(U∗(Q)−U∗(1Ω)). (Here ∂+ is the right-sided derivative with respect
to t.)
Now consider α 6= 0. Set x(t) = βtα+t(β−α) and R(t) := P + x(t)(Q − P ). This
is in P∗ for all t small enough. Moreover, a straightforward calculation shows
Pα + t(Qβ − Pα) = R(t)α+t(β−α). Therefore, by Omega-linearity (6),
f(t) = U∗(R(t)α+t(β−α)) = (α+ t(β − α))U∗(R(t)) + (1− (α+ t(β − α)))U∗(1Ω).
Then (U∗)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) is the partial derivative
∂+f(t)|t=0 = α∂+U∗(R(t))|t=0 + (β − α)U∗(R(0))− (β − α)U∗(1Ω).
Note that ∂+x(t)|t=0 = βα , so ∂+U∗(R(t))|t=0 = βα∂+U∗(P + t(Q − P ))|t=0 =
β
α (U
∗)′P (Q− P ). Therefore
(U∗)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) = β(U∗)′P (Q− P ) + (β − α)(U∗(P )− U∗(1Ω))
as claimed. In particular, U∗ is Gaˆteaux differentiable at Pα.
Next, suppose that U∗ is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at P ∈ P∗; fix u ∈
∇U∗P . We claim u ∈ ∇U∗Pα for any α ∈ (0, 1]. First note that, by (8), we have∫
W∗ ud(P−1Ω) = −(U∗)′P (1Ω−P ) = U∗(P )−U∗(1Ω). Then calculate:
∫
W∗ u d(Qβ−
Pα) =
∫
W∗ u d(Qβ−Pβ)+
∫
W∗ u d(Pβ−Pα) = β
∫
W∗ u d(Q−P )+(β−α)
∫
W∗ u d(P−
1Ω) = β(U
∗)′P (Q− P ) + (β − α)(U∗(P )− U∗(1Ω)) = (U∗)′Pα(Qβ − Pα). 
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Proof of Proposition 4.2.4. Since P∗ includes P, every element of P∗ is of the
form Pα := αP + (1 − α)1Ω for some P ∈ P and α ∈ [0, 1]. Define U∗(Pα) =
αU(P ) + (1− α)c. Then U∗ is Omega-linear. Let %P∗ be the preorder represented
by U∗. Omega Independence follows immediately from Omega-linearity. As for
Gaˆteaux differentiability, it suffices to prove the following minor variant on Lemma
A.0.3:
(a) If U is Gaˆteaux differentiable at P ∈ P, then U∗ is Gaˆteaux differentiable at
Pα, for all α ∈ [0, 1].
(b) If U is integrally Gaˆteaux differentiable at P ∈ P, then U∗ is Gaˆteaux differen-
tiable at Pα, for all α ∈ (0, 1].
For (a), we use (8) to calculate (U∗)′Pα(Qβ − Pα) for any Q ∈ P, β ∈ [0, 1]; note
that, in (8), (U∗)′P (P −Q) = U ′P (P −Q). For (b), given u ∈ ∇UP , extend it to W∗
by u(Ω) = c+
∫
W u dP−U(P ). This ensures that
∫
W∗ ud(P−1Ω) = U∗(P )−U∗(Ω).
As in the proof of Lemma 8, direct calculation then shows that u ∈ ∇U∗Pα for any
α ∈ (0, 1]. 
Section 5.
Proof of Proposition 5.1.1. The proof of (i) is an easy version of the proof of
(ii), so we present only the latter.
Suppose that %∗0 is consistent with generalised utilitarianism, and specifically
corresponds to an individual preorder %P∗ . For any finite, non-empty I ⊂ I∗ and
h ∈ H∗I , define pIh := 1#I
∑
i∈I 1W∗i (h). Thus for h, h
′ ∈ H∗I , we have h %∗0 h′ iff
pIh %P∗ pIh′ . Suppose that k ∈ H∗ is an m-scaling of h ∈ H∗I , and that s is a
corresponding m-to-1 map. Then it is easy to see that pIh = p
s−1(I)
k . Now, given
h, h′ ∈ H∗I , their m-scalings k, k′, and corresponding m-to-1 maps s, s′, we can, by
applying a permutatation to k, ensure that s−1(I) = (s′)−1(I) =: J. Since then
k, k′ ∈ H∗J , we have
k %∗0 k′ ⇐⇒ pJk %P∗ pJk′ ⇐⇒ pIh %P∗ pIh′ ⇐⇒ h %∗0 h′.
Therefore %∗0 satisfies Scale Invariance.
Conversely, suppose that %∗0 satisfies Scale Invariance; we need to define a cor-
responding individual preorder. Recall that, by stipulation, we are only dealing
with finitely supported prospects. Let P∗0 be the set of prospects on W
∗ with finite
support and rational probabilities. We will first define a preorder on P∗0 and then
embed it in a preorder on P∗.
Choose a sequence of populations I1 ⊂ I2 ⊂ . . . such that #In = n. For any
p ∈ P∗0, there is some n > 0 and h ∈ In such that p = pInh . In this case say that h is
a realization of p at n. Note that if h is a realization of p at n, and k is a realization
of p at mn, then k must be an m-scaling of h.
For any p ∈ P∗0, let I(p) be the set of natural numbers n such that p has a
realization at n. It is easy to see that, given m,n ∈ I, we also have m+ n ∈ I, and
if furthermore m > n, then also m−n ∈ I. It follows from the Euclidean algorithm
that I(p) contains the greatest common divisor N(p) of its elements, so that I(p)
is the set of multiples of N(p).
Similarly, for any pair p, p′ ∈ P∗0, let I(p, p′) be the set of natural numbers n such
that p, p′ both have realizations at n. It follows from what we just said that I(p, p′)
consists of all multiples of the least common multiple N(p, p′) of N(p) and N(p′).
The scale-invariance of %∗0 yields the following observation. If h, h′ are realizations
of p, p′ at m ∈ I(p, p′), and k, k′ are realizations of p, p′ at n ∈ I(p, p′), then h %∗0 h′
if and only if k %∗0 k′.
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This allows us to define %P∗0 on P
∗
0 as follows.
p %P∗0 p
′ ⇐⇒ for some (therefore any) n ∈ I(p, p
′), there are
realizations h, h′ of p, p′ at n with h %∗0 h′.
This is a preorder. In particular it is transitive, since, given p, p′, p′′ ∈ P∗0, we can
consider realizations h, h′, h′′ of p, p′, p′′ at some common n. If p %P∗0 p′ %P∗0 p′′
then we must have h %∗0 h′ %∗0 h′′. Since %0 is transitive, h %0 h′′, and therefore
p %P∗0 p′′.
Let us also check that %P∗0 satisfies Omega Independence. Suppose given p, p′ ∈
P∗0, and m/n =: α ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q. Then realizations of p, p′ at N(p, p′)m are realiza-
tions of αp+ (1− α)1Ω and αp′ + (1− α)1Ω at N(p, p′)n. It follows that p %P∗0 p′
if and only if αp+ (1− α)1Ω %P∗0 αp′ + (1− α)1Ω, as desired.
We now embed %P∗0 in a preorder %P∗ on P
∗, the convex hull of P∗0:
p %P∗ p′ ⇐⇒
{
p, p′ ∈ P∗0 and p %P∗0 p′, or
p = p′.
Then %P∗ is a preorder on P∗ which satisfies Omega Independence. Let %∗ be
the social preorder on L∗ it generates. Then, for any finite non-empty set I ⊂ I∗
such that h and h′ are in H∗I , h %∗0 h′ ⇐⇒ pIh %P∗ pIh′ ⇐⇒ pI1h %P∗ pI1h′ ⇐⇒
1h %∗ 1h′ . This shows that %∗0 is consistent with the generalized utilitarian preorder
%∗. 
Dept. of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
E-mail address, Corresponding author: davidmccarthy1@gmail.com
Dept. of Mathematics and Systems Analysis, Aalto University, Finland
E-mail address: kalle.mikkola@iki.fi
Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
E-mail address: teru.thomas@oxon.org
